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JURISDICTION 
The authority believed to confer jurisdiction on the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah to hear this appeal from a 
recommendation of discipline by the Board of Bar Commissioners 
(the "Board") of the Utah State Bar (the "Bar") is Article VIII, 
Section 3 of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann, 
S 78-2-2(3)(c) (1988). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review in this 
case: 
1. Whether many of the factual findings upon which 
the Bar's disciplinary hearing panel (the "Panel") based its 
recommendation that appellant, J. Richard Calder ("Calder") be 
disbarred exceeded the express or implied scope of conduct 
outlined by the Bar's two complaints against Calder. 
2. Whether in investigating and deciding one of the 
two disciplinary complaints, the Panel misapprehended applicable 
substantive law, thereby inducing it to enter a number of clearly 
- erroneous factual findings. 
3. Whether many of the findings of fact upon which 
the Panel concluded that Calder should be disbarred were either 
not established with the clear and convincing evidence required 
by Rule XII(c) of the Bar's Procedures of Discipline (the 
"Procedures") and/or are so clearly erroneous as to require that 
they be overturned. 
4. Whether the Panel improperly failed to consider 
several mitigating factors in electing to recommend the draconian 
remedy of disbarment. 
5. Whether the recommendation of disbarment is so 
completely disproportionate to the conduct found by the Panel to 
constitute ethical violations as to be arbitrary, capricious and 
unreasonable. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES OR RULES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is believed 
to be solely determinative of the outcome of this case. However, 
many provisions of the Bar's Rules of Professional Conduct and 
the Procedures are relevant to the disposition of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(1) Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposi-
tion by the Panel and the Board. This is a disciplinary proceed-
ing instituted by the Bar's counsel pursuant to Rule VIII(e) of 
the Procedures. After its formal complaints (the "Complaints") 
were consolidated, the Panel conducted an evidentiary hearing 
both on the Complaints and on issues not raised by the Com-
plaints. On February 16, 1989, the Panel made and entered its 
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Findings of Factf (the "Findings") Conclusions of Law (the 
"Conclusions") and Recommendation of Discipline (the "Recommenda-
tion") which were adopted by the Board on March 24, 1989. (See 
App. i). Calder timely objected to the Findings, Conclusions and 
Recommendation. (R. 141-55). After considering the objections, 
a three member hearing panel of the Board perfunctorily denied 
them by order dated May 24, 1989. (R. 195-6). It is that 
determination, together with the underlying Findings, Conclusions 
and Recommendations, from which this appeal is taken. 
A. Procedural Background. 
Calder has been licensed to practice law in the State 
of Utah since August, 1974. (Tr. 275).1 Since 1981, Calder's 
primary area of practice has been bankruptcy. (Tr. 279.) He 
serviced approximately 700 to 800 bankruptcy cases per year 
during 1985, 1986 and 1987, s^e Tr. 283-85, and a substantial 
number of additional bankruptcy cases before 1985. (Tr. 279). 
Of the several thousand clients Calder represented between 1974 
and the present, only two of them — Larry Bailey ("Bailey") and 
1
 All references to the trial transcript will be to the original 
page number assigned by the reporter, and not to the pagination 
scheme employed by the Bar. 
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Dennis Job ("Job") — filed written complaints against Calder 
2 
with the Bar* 
The Bar's formal complaint in the Bailey matter was 
filed on October 23, 1987. (Trial Ex. B-l attached hereto as 
App. ii). The Bar's formal amended complaint in the Job matter 
was filed on June 2f 1987. (Trial Ex. B-27 attached hereto as 
App. iii). Neither of the Complaints made any mention of the 
Bar's intent to scrutinize Calder's conduct for any period after 
1986. LdL 
B. Bailey Complaint and Disposition. 
Bailey retained Calder in 1978 to file a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy petition for him. (Tr. 28). Bailey claimed, and the 
Panel so found, that Bailey informed Calder of the existence of a 
judgment in the amount of $1,400.00 arising from an automobile 
accident in which Bailey was involved; that Calder inadvertently 
2
 While it is true that in 1983 a clerk of the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah referred to the Bar 20 
separate alleged deficiencies that the clerk discerned in 
Calder1s representation of clients, the Bar's investigation was 
concluded by a private reprimand. Notably, none of those clients 
ever made any complaint to the Bar regarding any aspect of 
Calder1s representation of their interests. The private repri-
mand, obviously, is relevant only to the issue of the sanction, 
if any, to be imposed against Calder. It is not relevant to the 
issue of whether Calder breached any of the ethical and profes-
sional obligations alleged by the Bar's Complaints in his repre-
sentation of Messers. Bailey and Job. 
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failed to list the judgment on Bailey's bankruptcy schedule; that 
as ^ a result of that omission, Bailey was precluded from obtaining 
a Utah driver's license necessary for his employment as an 
erstwhile truck driver; and, that as a result of that omission, 
Bailey was unable to obtain employment for an unspecified period 
of time. (Findings Nos. 1(a) and (p); R. 121, 151). 
The "evidence" supporting the finding that the omission 
of the judgment debt precluded Bailey from obtaining a Utah 
driver's license consists solely of hearsay i.e., what an unspec-
ified representative of the Utah Department of Motor Vehicles 
allegedly told Bailey the consequences of his failure to have the 
judgment satisfied or discharged would be. (See Tr. 35, 76). 
The record is devoid of any copy of the alleged judgment, any 
official records maintained by the Utah Department of Motor 
Vehicles even hinting at the existence of the alleged judgment, 
or any proof that during 1979 (the year in which Bailey claimed 
he was denied a new driver's license) Utah law provided that a 
judgment debtor's discharge in bankruptcy could facilitate the 
3 
issuance of a renewed license. 
3 Indeed, as demonstrated in Argument II infra, Utah law in 1979 
provided just the opposite. Utah Code Ann., S 41-12-15 (1979) 
provided in pertinent part that "[a] discharge in bankruptcy fol-
lowing the rendering of any such judgment shall not relieve the 
judgment debtor from any of the requirements of this act." 
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In 1983, Bailey complained to the Bar about Calder's 
omission of the alleged judgment. His complaint was dismissed by 
the Bar's screening panel which determined that ". . . the 
complaint was not timely filed . . and, therefore, determined 
that it would be dismissed for that reason." (Tr. 122), After 
that determination was made, however, Calder unilaterally volun-
teered (with no pressure from the Bar's counsel or the Board) to 
". . . proceed with amending the schedules and getting the matter 
taken care of." Id. 
Based on his then-existing understanding that effecting 
an amendment to Bailey1s bankruptcy schedules was a simple, 
ministerial task for which the bankruptcy court would charge only 
a $10.00 amendment fee, Calder agreed to solve the problem 
through Bailey's payment of that fee. (Tr. 123). However, 
unbeknownst to Calder, Bailey's bankruptcy case had been closed 
by the court and the files had been shipped to a central filing 
office in Denver, Colorado. (Tr. 329). The additional fee to 
reopen the case would be $50.00. (Id.; Trial Exs. B-15 and 
B-16). 
During his telephone conversations with the Bar's 
counsel, Jeffery C. Paoletti, Calder expressly stated his posi-
tion that he was entitled to payment of an additional attorney's 
fee to cover the ". . . additional work that he was doing." 
-6-
(Tr. 125). While " . . . the resolution at the end of that 
conversation was that [Calder] was to take an additional $15.00," 
the issue of the additional attorney's fees quoted by Calder was 
unresolved inasmuch as Paoletti understood that Calder was not 
prepared to waive any of his attorney's fees to solve the prob-
lem. Id. Unfortunately, Paoletti never provided Calder with any 
writing memorializing his perception of Calder's voluntarily 
assumed commitment to amend Bailey's bankruptcy schedules. (Tr. 
137, 138).4 
In Finding No. K g ) , the Panel found that: 
Though [Calder] presented conflicting evi-
dence as to the agreement, the Panel 
accepted [Paoletti's] testimony as the most 
credible evidence of [Calder's] agreement to 
represent Mr. Bailey in amending his Bank-
ruptcy. " 
However, Paoletti himself frankly acknowledged in his testimony 
that " . . . I don't have a clear recollection of all of the 
events." (Tr. 121). 
In any event, by letter dated December 16, 1983, Calder 
informed Bailey that Calder's net charges for effecting the 
amendment would be $120.00 — $70.00 for attorney's fees and 
4
 Paoletti's confirming letter was sent only to Bailey. (Trial 
Ex. B-12). 
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$50.00 for filing fees. (Trial Ex. B-16). As noted above, Bailey 
paid only $15.00 of the quoted charges. (Tr. 51). In January, 
1984, Calder filed a motion to reopen Bailey's bankruptcy pro-
ceeding so that the purported judgment could be discharged. 
(Trial Ex. B-18). Calder admitted that the motion was incomplete 
and would need to be supplemented. (Tr. 530). However, because 
Bailey refused to pay any more than $15.00 of the charges quoted 
by Calder, Calder refrained from noticing up for hearing the 
motion to reopen. (Tr. 330, 529). On February 15, 1984, the 
bankruptcy court sua sponte denied the motion without prejudice. 
(Trial Ex. B-19). Its order explicitly stated that the motion 
5 
could be later renewed. Id. 
Upon learning of the court's action, Bailey berated 
Calder's office staff. (Trial Ex. B-20; Tr. 356). Calder 
accordingly informed Bailey by letter dated February 16, 1984 
that he should find new counsel. (Trial Ex. B-20). With that 
letter, Calder enclosed the entire contents of Bailey's file and 
a check in the amount of $15.00 as a voluntary refund of the 
monies Bailey had previously paid. Id. 
5
 Indeed, two months later, Bailey hired new counsel who did 
just that and succeeded in having the allegedly omitted judgment 
lien discharged. (Trial Ex. B-22; Tr. 101). 
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In its Findings, the Panel cast these events in the 
following terms: 
[l]b. In or about October 1983, [Calder] 
entered into an engagement with Mr. Bailey, 
arranged through Bar Counsel, C. Jeffrey 
Paoletti, to resolve an investigation of a 
disciplinary complaint filed by Mr. Bailey 
against [Calder]. By this engagement, 
[Calder] agreed that he would obtain an 
amendment to Mr. Bailey's bankruptcy sched-
ules and obtain a discharge for Mr. Bailey of 
a judgment debt owed by Mr. Bailey to Richard 
D. and Morren C. Harris in the sum of about 
$1,400.00. 
c. [Calder] agreed to complete the 
engagement and achieve the objective upon Mr. 
Bailey's paying $10.00 for additional 
attorney's fees; Mr. Bailey made said payment 
of $10.00 to [Calder]. 
d. After accepting the engagement and 
agreeing upon the fee to be charged, [Calder] 
demanded additional money from Mr. Bailey, in 
the amount of $120.00, in order to initiate 
the engagement. Mr. Bailey complained to 
Mr. Paelotti [sic] about this additional fee. 
e. Subsequent to the October 1983 
engagement, numerous communications were 
exchanged between Mr. Bailey and [Calder], 
and between [Calder] and Bar Counsel which 
concluded with [Calder] reaffirming his 
agreement to continue representing Mr. Bailey 
in amending the bankruptcy schedules. Mr. 
Bailey paid an additional $15.00 to [Calder], 
at [Calder]fs request, in furtherance of the 
engagement. 
f. After reaffirming the engagement, 
[Calder] filed documents with the Bankruptcy 
Court on behalf of Mr. Bailey as Mr. Bailey's 
counsel. 
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g. Though [Calder] presented conflict-
ing evidence as to the agreement, the Panel 
accepted former Bar Counsel C. Jeffrey 
Paelotti's [sic] testimony as the most 
credible evidence of [Calder]fs agreement to 
represent Mr. Bailey in amending his Bank-
ruptcy. 
h. [Calder] filed a Motion to Reopen 
Mr. Bailey1s case, but the Motion was 
inadequate on its face. 
i. After filing the Motion with the 
Bankruptcy Court, [Calder] failed to follow 
through with his representation of Mr. Bailey 
by failing to schedule the Motion to Reopen 
for hearing and by failing to present the 
Motion to the judge for consideration. 
j. The Motion to reopen was denied, 
and, immediately upon learning of the Courtfs 
order, [Calder] withdrew from representing 
Mr. Bailey. At no time after February 16, 
1984, did [Calder] make any effort to obtain 
substitute counsel for Bailey, return the 
$10.00 paid by Bailey, refund any portion of 
the original attorney's fees and costs paid 
by Bailey for the Chapter 7, take any steps 
with the Department of Motor Vehicles to 
assist Bailey obtain a driver's license or, 
in any other way, assist Bailey in achieving 
the desired objective." 
A year later, in 1985, Bailey filed a civil complaint 
against Calder for malpractice. That complaint was dismissed 
with prejudice at the conclusion of Bailey's case in chief at 
trial. (Tr. 7). Before Bailey's complaint was dismissed, 
however, Calder prepared, signed and filed an affidavit in the 
malpractice case. (Trial Ex. B-26). Calder admitted at the 
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bar trial that several of the statements in the affidavit were 
false. He insisted, however, that the misstatements were inad-
vertent. (Tr. 337-39, 355, 483, 531). The Panel, in Finding 
No. l(k), determined that the misstatements were made "knowingly 
and intentionally." (R. 123-4). 
C. Job Complaint and Disposition. 
In representing Job, Calder omitted from Job's bank-
ruptcy schedules the existence of a lawsuit in which Job had an 
interest. (Finding No. 2(b); R. 151-2). The suit was entitled 
Job, et al. v. Pocklington, et al.. United States District Court 
for the District of Utah, Civil No. C82-1085C (the "Pocklington 
Case"). Calder readily admits that he did not "take reasonable 
steps and precautions to ensure that this cause of action was 
properly scheduled and listed in Job's Chapter 7 case." (Finding 
No. 2(b); R. 151-2). He does, however, deny that Job ever 
mentioned that the Pocklington Case had in fact been filed; that 
he was ever informed of the amount of damages sought in the 
Pocklington Case; that he was ever provided with any papers 
generated in the Pocklington Case; or, that he was ever informed 
of the identity of any counsel in the Pocklington Case. (Tr. 
196, 199, 200). Indeed, the only information Job gave to Calder 
about the Pocklington case was that it was a "possible claim 
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against Pacific Coast League for defamation of Peter Pocklington, 
value undetermined." (Tr. 196f 406). 
Several months after filing the Chapter 7 petition for 
Jobf Calder suggested and Job agreed that a Chapter 13 petition 
be filed on the heels of the Chapter 7 for the dual purposes of 
administering and preserving the Pocklington Case and forestall-
ing Job's mortgage lender from foreclosing its mortgage against 
Job's home. (Tr. 151- 52). After the Chapter 13 petition was 
filed, Job failed to attend the first meeting of creditors. (Tr. 
235, 504). Both Calder and his secretary testified that before 
the meeting Calder repeatedly and heatedly urged Job to be in 
attendance. (Tr. 506, 703). When Job failed to do so, Calder 
filed with the bankruptcy court a motion for leave to withdraw as 
Job's counsel. (Tr. 238-39, 432). Job received a copy of that 
motion shortly after it was mailed on July 3, 1984. (Tr. 160, 
238-39). Court hearing on the motion was conducted more than one 
month later on August 6, 1984, at which time the motion was 
granted. (Tr. 239). In the face of those facts, however, the 
Bar found that: 
"[Calder] withdrew from representing Mr. Job 
in July, 1984, without Mr. Job's consent or 
knowledge. At the time of his withdrawal 
[Calder] knew that it would be difficult for 
Mr. Job to obtain substitute counsel to 
resist the Chapter 13 trustee's pending 
motion for dismissal." (Finding No. 2(e)). 
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At a hearing on August 8r 1984, Job's Chapter 13 
petition was dismissed and his previous Chapter 7 discharge was 
revoked, with the result that Job admittedly did not obtain any 
final relief in bankruptcy. (Finding No. 2(g)). However, 
according to Bankruptcy Judge, Judith A. Boulden, Job consented 
to that action: the court inquired " . . . if that's what he 
wanted done and he [Job] said 'yes'.n (Tr. 634). 
Job subsequently sought to retain new counsel to file a 
Chapter 11 petition to forestall an impending trustee's sale on 
his house. (Tr. 169). After engaging new counsel, he was 
informed by that counsel on the very morning of the sale that 
counsel would not file the Chapter 11 petition unless and until 
certain additional attorney's fees were paid. Id. Job was unable 
to timely pay the required fees. Id. As a result, his Chapter 
11 petition was filed several minutes after the trustee's sale 
was conducted. (Tr. 169-70). There is no evidence that Job's 
successor counsel ever sought to vacate the trustee's sale as a 
violation of the automatic stay by arguing that the filing of his 
Chapter 11 petition occurred before the trustee's deed was 
delivered. 
In September, 1984, Job filed a malpractice action 
against Calder. (Finding No. 2(i)). Although Calder had already 
filed and was operating under his own Chapter 13 plan, Calder 
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neglected to list Job as a creditor. (Finding No. 2(j)). 
However, according to Calder, that failure was attributable to 
his misapprehension that Job's claim constituted a post-petition 
debt which could not be discharged in bankruptcy. (Tr. 442-45f 
512, 779-81). Accordingly, Calder refrained from informing the 
state court of the imposition of the automatic stay until Febru-
ary, 1986. Id. 
On July 16, 1985, Calder filed a motion to reopen Job's 
Chapter 11 proceeding. (Finding No. 2(k)). The Panel deter-
mined that the motion was filed "solely with the intent to 
harass, injure and annoy Mr. Job." Id. That finding, however, 
ignores any mention of the justification advanced by Calder for 
the filing of the affidavit: to discharge his obligation as an 
officer of the court to inform the court that false or otherwise 
improper disclosures were being made by a debtor seeking its 
protection. (Tr. 450). 
On July 18, 1985, Calder filed an affidavit in Job's 
state court case. (Finding No. 2(m)). In that affidavit, Calder 
set forth possible explanations that he had for the omission of 
the Pocklington Case as an asset on Job's bankruptcy schedules. 
Those explanations were found by the Panel to be lacking in 
factual basis and " . . . indicative of an attitude of bad faith 
which pervades [Calder1s] conduct in connection with the Utah 
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State Bar disciplinary proceedings and the court proceedings." 
(Finding No. 2(n)). 
D. Calder Bankruptcy Petitions. 
Just before the court entered a judgment against Calder 
in Job's state court action, Calder transferred an allegedly fl. . 
• substantial portion of his property to his wife and brother." 
(Finding No. 2(o)). Calder testified that the purpose for the 
transfers was two-fold: to designate his wife as a joint tenant 
with rights of survivorship for estate planning purposes and to 
secure a loan obligation that he had just incurred to his brother 
in the amount of $40f000.00 to pay the IRS for back taxes. (Tr. 
512-16, 544, 755-57). In addition, a review of Calder's bank-
ruptcy schedules discloses that the value of assets transferred 
to his wife was insubstantial. (Compare Trial Exs. B-32 and 
B-33; Tr. 605, 389-402). The validity and legality of those 
transfers are ". . . the subject of pending adversary proceed-
ings" by Calder's Chapter 7 trustee. (Finding No. 2(o)) (Empha-
sis added). According to the trustee, those proceedings have not 
yet been resolved. (Tr. 565). 
One of Calder's Chapter 13 petitions was dismissed in 
1986 on the basis that it was filed in bad faith. (Finding No. 
3). The Panel determined that Calder's intent in filing the 
Chapter 13 was ". . .to frustrate the claims of Job and Bailey." 
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Id. In determining that intent, however, the Panel ignored 
Calder's explanation that his purpose for filing the 1984 peti-
tion was to save his house from an IRS sale and his purpose for 
filing the 1986 petition was to keep the assets of his law 
practice from being levied upon and dismembered by Job to the 
ultimate detriment of both Calder and his other creditors. In 
addition, that finding fails to reflect that in November, 1988, 
Calder posted a cash supersedeas bond in the amount of $55,000.00 
to fully satisfy Job's judgment (Tr. 790, 793-94). It also fails 
to reflect that Bailey's state court claim was dismissed with 
prejudice, no cause of action. (Tr. 7). 
When Calder filed the statement of affairs in his 1986 
Chapter 7 case, he utilized a pre-printed form statement for a 
debtor "not engaged in business," despite the fact that he was 
engaged in business. (Finding No. 4). However, Calder1s trustee 
in bankruptcy acknowledged that he (the trustee) was not preju-
diced or confused in any way by Calderfs use of the technically 
incorrect form since the substance of required disclosures on 
both forms was substantially identical. (Tr. 598). 
The Panel determined that Calder failed to fully and 
accurately disclose assets on his 1986 Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
schedules. (Finding No. 5). It held that the assets — without 
identifying which ones and what they were worth — listed on 
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those schedules were "substantially less" than those listed in 
either of Calder1s 1984 or 1986 Chapter 13 schedules. A review 
of those schedules, however, belies this finding. (See Trial 
Exs. B-30f B-31, B-32 and B-33). The finding also ignores the 
fact that many of the so-called discrepancies were attributable 
to Calder1s wife's interests being reflected on the 1984 filing 
and only his interests being reflected on the 1986 filing. (Tr. 
394,515). 
Despite the fact that the Bar's Complaints made no 
mention of the Bar's intent to impose sanctions against Calder 
for the bankruptcy court's denial of a general discharge in his 
own Chapter 7 case, and despite Calder's objection to the Panel's 
consideration of that issue, Tr. 179-83, the Panel made a spe-
cific finding that " . . . Calder's failure to list certain assets 
in his Chapter 7 bankruptcy was done 'knowingly and 
fraudulently'" (Finding No. 6). It is unclear what effect the 
Panel's unanticipated injection of this issue at trial had on its 
recommendation of disbarment. 
6
 Because the "undisclosed assets" consisted of two bank 
accounts having a balance of no more than $5.00 and an undefined 
and completely worthless interest in an unspecified mineral 
claim, Calder has recently appealed this order to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 
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In similar fashion, the Panel made a specific finding 
— although it never made the allegation in any of the Complaints 
— that Calder was denied the absolute right to convert his 
Chapter 7 case to a Chapter 13 case "in order to prevent [an] 
abuse of the bankruptcy process." (Finding No. 7). That finding 
is devoid of any mention that Calder has timely appealed that 
decision to the federal court. 
Based on the Findings, the Panel concluded that Calder 
breached several disciplinary rules for which he should be 
disbarred. (Conclusions of Law Nos. 1 and 2). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Complaint in the Bailey case was confined to 
the 1983 to 1985 time frame and the Complaint in the Job case was 
confined to the 1983 to 1986 time frame. Although both Com-
plaints focused only on Calderfs failure to adequately protect 
his clients' interests, and neither gave any hint of the Bar's 
intent to challenge the sufficiency of Calder's disclosure to the 
bankruptcy court in connection with his own personal bankruptcy 
filings, the Bar allowed the admission of substantial evidence on 
this issue. Its decision to do so unfairly prejudiced Calder in 
his ability to understand, respond to and rebut the only evidence 
that the Panel could find to support its finding of "dishonesty 
and fraud." 
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2. In deciding the Bailey Complaint, the Panel 
completely misapprehended the 1979 version of Section 41-12-15 of 
the Utah Motor Vehicle Act. By doing sof the Panel was induced 
to issue a series of clearly erroneous factual findings — 
findings based on its mistaken view of the law. Each of these 
findings must be vacated. 
3. Because it is the sole and ultimate responsibility 
of the Supreme Court to impose discipline on lawyers, this 
responsibility cannot be delegated unqualifiedly to the Bar. As 
such, the Bar's Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation are 
advisory in nature and are entitled to little of the deference 
customarily accorded lower court determinations. Under this 
standard of review, few of the Findings, Conclusions and Recom-
mendations can be sustained. 
4. Many of the Findings of fact upon which the Panel 
concluded that Calder should be disbarred were either not estab-
lished by clear and convincing evidence and/or are so clearly 
erroneous as to require that they be vacated. If any of the 
Findings are so vacated, the resulting Conclusions and Recommen-
dation cannot stand and must be reversed. 
5. The Panel improperly failed to consider or find 
any mitigating factors during the penalty phase of the proceed-
ing. Had it properly applied the applicable ABA Standards for 
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Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the severity of the proposed Recommen-
dation would have been considerably reduced. Accordingly, the 
case should be remanded to the Panel with instructions to recon-
sider the Recommendation in light of these mitigating factors. 
6. In light of the extraordinary extent to which (i) 
neither the findings nor the Recommendation conform to the Bar's 
Complaints, (ii) the Findings are unsupported by the evidence and 
(iii) the Recommendation exceeds the scope of the Findings, the 
Panel's recommendation of disbarment is so flawed as to render 
the Panel's action arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable. On 
that basis, the Findings and Conclusions must be vacated and the 
Recommendation rejected. 
ARGUMENT I 
THE PANEL IMPROPERLY AND PREJUDICIALLY 
CONSIDERED ISSUES FAR BEYOND THE EXPRESS OR 
IMPLIED SCOPE OF ITS COMPLAINTS AGAINST 
CALDER. 
A careful review of the Bar's formal Complaints in the 
Bailey and Job proceedings, see App. ii and iii infra, discloses 
that the conduct to be scrutinized by the Panel in the Bailey 
case was confined to the 1983 to 1985 time frame and the conduct 
to be scrutinized in the Job case was confined to the 1983 to 
1986 time frame. Both Complaints focus only on Calder's failure 
to adequately protect his clients' interests. Neither Complaint 
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offers any real clue that the Bar intended to challenge the 
sufficiency of Calderfs disclosures to the bankruptcy court in 
connection with his own personal bankruptcy filings. 
At trial, however, the Bar allowed its own appointed 
prosecutor to introduce a multitude of such evidence. Specifi-
cally, it allowed the introduction of the bankruptcy schedules 
and statements of affairs which Calder filed in his personal 
bankruptcies. (See Trial Exs. B-30, B-31, B-32, B-33). It also 
allowed, over Calder1s objection, see Tr. 179-83, the introduc-
tion of a memorandum decision and order dated September 27, 1988, 
in which the bankruptcy court denied Calder a general discharge 
in bankruptcy for his supposedly knowing and fraudulent omission 
of certain assets from his bankruptcy schedules. (See Trial Ex. 
B-39). In addition, the Panel allowed the introduction of an 
order dated November 18, 1988, in which the bankruptcy court 
denied Calderfs motion to convert his Chapter 7 proceeding to a 
Q 
Chapter 13 proceeding. 
7
 As indicated at n.6 supra, the "undisclosed assets "are de 
minimis and their non-disclosure as a basis for denying Calder a 
general discharge in bankruptcy is currently on appeal. 
8
 Calder has also appealed this decision to the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah in Case No. 89-C-59W. 
This appeal is still pending. 
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Utah law recognizes that "the attorney against whom the 
accusations [of unethical conduct] have been made is entitled to 
a fair hearing and an opportunity to know all that he must meet 
and the right to present such evidence as he may be able to 
produce, to rebut or overcome the allegation of misconduct." In 
re Strong, 616 P.2d 583, 586 (Utah 1980) (Emphasis added). 
Clearly, the Panel's decision, over Calder*s objection, to allow 
the introduction of the non-dischargability decision prejudiced 
Calder by injecting 1988 issues into what the Bar represented 
were 1983 to 1986 Complaints. The admission into evidence of 
Calderfs bankruptcy schedules and statements of affairs and the 
bankruptcy court's 1988 orders disposing of those filings was 
completely improper. It prejudically expanded the scope of the 
allegations against Calder without any advance notice or meaning-
ful opportunity to rebut the new charges. If ever there was a 
procedural ambush at the O.K. Corral, it is this case. 
The Bar may well argue that because Calderfs former 
counsel failed to object to some of the procedural action chal-
lenged by this appeal, Calder impliedly consented to an expansion 
of the issues originally articulated in the two Complaints. 
However, it is well recognized that the presence of unfair 
prejudice to the party against whom evidence on previously 
undisclosed issues is offered, precludes any finding that the 
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party impliedly consented to the trying of that issue. As 
Professor Moore has stated: 
The purpose of an amendment to conform to 
proof is to bring the pleadings in line with 
the actual issues upon which the case was 
tried; therefore an amendment after judgment 
which brings in some entirely extrinsic issue 
or changes the theory on which the case was 
actually tried is not permissible, even 
though there is evidence in the record — 
introduced as relevant to some other issue — 
which would support the amendment. This 
principle is sound since it cannot be fairly 
said that there is any implied consent to try 
an issue if the parties do not squarely 
recognize it as an issue in the trial. The 
test should be whether the defendant would be 
prejudiced by the implied amendment, i.e., 
whether he had a fair opportunity to defend 
and whether he could offer any additional 
evidence if the case were to be retried on a 
different theory. In terms of the Rule, 
where such prejudice is found, it can be said 
that no implied consent exists." 
3 Moore's Federal Practice H 15.13[2] at 15-131 (1989). (Empha-
sis added). 
Thus, in the case at hand, it can safely be said that 
Calder's understanding and expectation of the claims asserted 
against him was that they were defined and measured by the 
Complaints — Complaints that nowhere mentioned or called into 
question the propriety of his conduct in his own personal bank-
ruptcies. The justification advanced by the Bar's prosecutor for 
the admission of such evidence — that proof of Calder's conduct 
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in his own bankruptcies was relevant to his state of mind, see 
Tr. 182 — never put Calder on notice that his 1988 conduct was 
at issue and could form the basis for substantive findings of 
improper conduct for which he could be disbarred. As such, there 
is no way Calder could be deemed to have impliedly consented to 
an amendment of the Complaints. 
Moreover, many courts have stated that failure to 
object alone does not constitute implied consent. Southwestern 
Stationery and Bank Supply, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 624 F.2d 168 
(10th Cir. 1980) (when plaintiffs sought a Rule 15(b) amendment 
on the basis of evidence which was also relevant to the pleaded 
claim, there was no implied consent to the trial of the unpleaded 
claims even though the defendant made no objection to the evi-
dence); McCleod v. Stevens, 617 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1980) (since 
all evidence introduced was relevant to the pleaded equitable 
claim, failure of defendant to object to its admission was not an 
implied consent to trial of an unpleaded damages claim). 
The applicability of this principle to Calder1s appeal 
is obvious: while the Bar sought to justify the introduction of 
the 1988 conduct on the basis that it went to Calderfs state of 
mind in his representation of Messrs. Bailey and Job, the Panel 
then used the 1988 conduct as substantive support for separate 
factual findings that Calder acted unethically. On that basis, 
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no fewer than five of the twelve separate Findings (Findings Nos. 
3f 4, 5, 6 and 7) articulate various aspects of Calder's 1988 
conduct. From those findings, the Panel then issued a multitude 
of conclusions of law reciting Calder!s supposed "dishonesty and 
Q 
fraud." See e.g. Conclusions Nos. K b ) , (c), (d) and 2(b)). In 
other words, Calder never understood, nor could he reasonably 
have been required to understand, that the evidence of his 1988 
conduct adduced by the Bar's prosecutor would be relied upon as 
an independent basis for the making of substantiative findings of 
fact on which the Bar would base its decision (at least in part) 
to disbar him. As such, it cannot be said that Calder impliedly 
consented to the introduction of such issues. 
Finally, there is at least one additional reason 
militating against any finding that Calder impliedly consented to 
being tried for his 1988 conduct. Under Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b), 
the Bar would have been required to state with particularity the 
circumstances alleged to constitute the fraudulent or dishonest 
conduct of which it was complaining. (See Rule XII (b) of the 
9
 Interestingly, the Panel's only conclusions of "dishonesty and 
fraud" are those based upon Calder's 1988 conduct in his own 
bankruptcies — conduct never disclosed by the Complaints. Take 
away that conduct and this proceeding presents, at best, little 
more than a lawyer's inadvertent neglect of his clients' inter-
ests, hardly a case justifying disbarment. 
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Procedures). Obviously, by refraining from making such allega-
tions in the Complaints, and then springing those allegations on 
Calder for the first time at trial, the Bar deprived Calder of 
any opportunity to receive an advance itemization of the precise 
conduct deemed to be fraudulent; it deprived him of any opportu-
nity to intelligently address those charges; and, it precluded 
him from taking any of the procedural steps contemplated by the 
rules to require the Bar, like any other litigant, to articulate 
with specificity the precise factual basis on which it was making 
allegations of fraudulent conduct. The need for such specificity 
has been aptly stated by one court as follows: 
The pleading of fraud, however, is also the 
last remaining habitat of the common law 
notion that a complaint should be suffi-
ciently specific that the court can weed out 
non-meritorious actions on the basis of the 
pleadings. Thus, the pleadings should be 
sufficient fto enable the courts to determine 
whether, on the facts pleaded, there is any 
foundation, prima facie at least, for the 
charge of fraud.fW [Citation omitted.] 
Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., 
673 P.2d 660, 672 (Cal. 1983). 
Because Calder was deprived of any opportunity to 
understand or respond to the allegations of fraud made against 
him for the first time at trial, the Panel's Findings and 
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Conclusions, particularly Findings Nos. 3f 4, 5, 6 and 7 and 
Conclusions Nos. K b ) , (c), (d) and 2(b) must be vacated. 
ARGUMENT II 
THE PANEL'S TOTAL MISAPPREHENSION OF THE 1979 
VERSION OF S 41-12-15 OF THE UTAH MOTOR 
VEHICLE ACT INDUCED A SERIES OF CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS FACTUAL FINDINGS. THEREFORE, THESE 
FINDINGS MUST BE VACATED. 
The major assumption underlying the Board's Findings 
and Conclusions in the Bailey case is that but for Calder's 
omission of an alleged judgment lien from Bailey's bankruptcy 
schedules, Bailey would have been able to obtain an automatic 
renewal of his Utah driver's license and pursue certain undefined 
employment opportunities. (See Finding Nos. 1(a) and (j) and 
Conclusion Nos. 1(e) and (g)). However, this assumption is 
totally unsupported by Utah law in effect in 1979 — the year in 
which Bailey claimed he was denied a renewed driver's license. 
(Tr. 35). Specifically, the 1979 version of S 41-12-15 of the 
Utah Motor Vehicle Act stated in pertinent part: 
A discharge in bankruptcy following the 
rendering of any such judgment shall not 
relieve the judgment debtor from any of the 
requirements of this act." 
Therefore, even if the judgment allegedly rendered 
against Bailey had been discharged in bankruptcy, that discharge 
would not have relieved Bailey from satisfying the judgment 
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through payment as a pre-condition to renewal of his driver's 
license. His assertion and the Panel's assumption to the con-
trary constitute a misapprehension of law which fatally induced a 
serious of clearly erroneous factual findings. Obviously, this 
Court may regard a finding as clearly erroneous if it determines 
that it was induced by an erroneous view of the law. State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). On that basis alone, the 
Court should vacate every factual finding made by the Panel in 
the Bailey proceeding. 
ARGUMENT III 
BECAUSE IT IS THE SOLE AND ULTIMATE RESPONSI-
BILITY OF THIS COURT TO IMPOSE DISCIPLINE ON 
CALDER, THIS RESPONSIBILITY CANNOT BE DELE-
GATED UNQUALIFIEDLY TO THE BAR. AS SUCH, THE 
BAR'S FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDA-
TION ARE ADVISORY IN NATURE AND ARE ENTITLED 
TO LITTLE OF THE DEFERENCE CUSTOMARILY 
ACCORDED FACTUAL FINDINGS. 
For more than forty years, this Court has made a number 
of pronouncements regarding the standard applicable to its review 
of findings, conclusions and recommendations regarding lawyer 
discipline. The Court has stated on various occasions that the 
Bar's findings and recommendations should be adopted absent some 
showing that they are arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or 
otherwise not supported by substantial evidence. See, e.g. , In 
re MacFarlane, 10 Utah 2d 217, 350 P.2d 61, 633 (1960) (". . . we 
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deem it discreet and proper to indulge considerable latitude to 
the actions and judgment of the commission in such [disciplinary] 
matters and would not disregard its finding and recommendation in 
the absence of some persuasive reason for doing so."); In re 
Fullmer, 17 Utah 2d 121, 405 P.2d 343, 344 (1965) ("nevertheless 
this Court is disposed . . . to look upon the findings and the 
recommendations of the Bar Commission with indulgence; and not to 
disregard its action lightly, nor at all unless there is some-
thing to persuade this Court that the Commission has acted 
capriciously or arbitrarily or beyond the scope of its powers, or 
is plainly in error1'). 
On the other hand, this Court has also stated that the 
Bar's recommendations are not " . . . to be in the same category 
. . ." as typical findings of fact " . . . because it is our 
responsibility to discipline an erring attorney and we cannot 
delegate that duty to others . . . " In re Bridwell, 25 Utah 2d 
1, 474 P.2d 116 (1970). Accord, In re Hughes, 534 P.2d 892 (Utah 
1975) (Court stated it was " . . . not bound to the recommendation 
of the Bar Commission . . . " ) . It was this seeming inconsistency 
in the applicable standard of review that prompted Justice 
Wilkins in a concurring decision in In re Robert B. Hansen, 584 
P.2d 805 (Utah 1978), to state: 
I respectfully suggest that this duality of 
standards (appearing both within a single 
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case and in cases compared one with the 
other) creates uncertainties and contradic-
tions which now require analysis, 
I believe for clarity and guidance, this 
Court should state unequivocally that the 
recommendations by the Bar are advisory only 
as ". . . w e cannot delegate that duty [of 
disciplining attorneys] to others . . ." 
(Footnote omitted) (Emphasis in original). 
Shortly after Justice Wilkins made his plea for a 
clearly stated and consistently applied standard of review, the 
Court in In re Phil L. Hansen, 586 P.2d 413, 417 (Utah 1978) 
stated that " . . . the recommendation of the Bar is only advisory 
and . . . the sanction or penalty to be imposed is for this court 
to determine [numerous citations omitted]." However, no more 
than two months later, the Court appeared to revert to the 
principle that the Bar's findings must be upheld unless they are 
found to be arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. In re 
Blackham, 588 P.2d 694, 696 (Utah 1978). Since that time, the 
Court has adhered to this principle on at least one occasion. In 
re Judd, 629 P.2d 437, 438 (Utah 1981) ("unless it appears that 
the Commission has acted arbitrarily or unreasonably, or unless 
those findings were not supported by substantial evidence," the 
findings will be upheld on appeal). 
However, in In re McCune, 717 P.2d 701 (Utah 1986), the 
Court recently recognized and stated that the Bar's 
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recommendation of discipline " . . . may be reviewed by this 
Court which may then 'take any action agreeable to its judg-
ment.1" Id. at 705. The rationale for this standard of review 
is that "only discipline which does not affect the lawyer's 
continued ability to practice is delegated to the Bar Commission. 
Suspension or disbarment can be authorized only by the Supreme 
Court." Id. at 709. Therefore, it now appears in Utah that 
factual findings underlying recommendations of disbarment are 
merely advisory in nature and not entitled to any particular 
deference. 
As demonstrated below, application of this standard of 
review to the facts of this case mandates the Court's rejection 
of the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation in their 
entirety. 
1 0
 Moreover, even if the Court elects for whatever reason to 
apply a more stringent standard of review, many of the Findings 
and Conclusions and the entire Recommendation are so arbitrary 
and infused with plain error as to require their rejection. See 
Argument VI infra. 
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ARGUMENT IV 
MANY OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT UPON WHICH THE 
PANEL CONCLUDED THAT CALDER SHOULD BE DIS-
BARRED WERE EITHER NOT ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR 
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE AND/OR ARE SO CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS AS TO REQUIRE THAT THEY BE VACATED. 
A. Many of the Findings are Unsupported by Clear and 
Convincing Evidence, 
Rule XII(c) of the Procedures states that "the burden 
of proof shall be on Bar counsel to sustain the formal committee 
complaint, or various counts thereof, by clear and convincing 
evidence." The term "clear and convincing evidence" has been 
defined to mean that ". . . the truth of the contention is 
'highly probable.1" McCormick, Handbook of the Lav of Evidence 
at 796 (1972). This Court has defined "clear and convincing 
evidence" to ". . .be such that there is no serious nor substan-
tial doubt what [the proposition for which the proof is offered] 
is." Paulsen v. Coombs, 254 P.2d 621, 624 (Utah 1953). In other 
words, "clear and convincing evidence" implies something more 
than the usual requirement of a preponderence of the evidence, 
but something less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Child 
v. Child. 8 Utah 2d 261, 332 P.2d 981, 986 (Utah 1958). 
In this case, there are at least two factors present in 
the Bailey proceeding that make it impossible for the clear and 
convincing standard to be met. First, the Panel explicitly 
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acknowledged that Calder's ethical culpability in the Bailey 
proceeding was determined in large part by balancing Calder's 
testimony (as to the terms and conditions of his voluntarily 
assumed commitment to assist Bailey) against that of the Bar's 
then-counsel, C. Jeffrey Paoletti. The Panel could not be 
clearer: 
Though [Calder] presented conflicting evi-
dence as to the agreement, the Panel accepted 
[Paoletti's] testimony as the most credible 
evidence of [Calder's] agreement to represent 
Mr. Bailey in amending his Bankruptcy. 
However, Paoletti frankly acknowledged in his testimony that 
" . . . I don't have a clear recollection of all of the events." 
(Tr. 121). In the face of that admission, it is inconceivable 
that the Panel could determine that Paoletti's inherently hazy 
testimony could rise to the level of "clear and convincing" 
evidence, especially where Calder himself testified that his 
agreement with the Bar was far different than the one Paoletti 
was having trouble remembering. As a matter of law, Paoletti's 
testimony could never be deemed "clear and convincing." 
Second, much of the "evidence" supporting the Panel's 
finding that Calder's omission of the judgment precluded Bailey 
from obtaining a Utah driver's license is comprised of hearsay, 
i.e., what an unspecified representative of the Utah Department 
of Motor Vehicles allegedly told Bailey the consequences of his 
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failure to have the judgment satisfied or discharged would be. 
(See Tr. 35, 76). Absent any copy of the alleged judgment or any 
official records maintained by the Utah Department of Motor 
Vehicles tending to corroborate the hearsay testimony, the 
quality of the evidence is singularly unsatisfactory. Indeed, if 
the rationale for excluding hearsay evidence is that such evi-
dence is intrinsically untrustworthy, it clearly follows that 
once such evidence is admitted, it cannot alone constitute "clear 
and convincing11 evidence. See State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 
310 P.2d 388, 390 (1957) (Hearsay evidence is generally not 
admissible on the ground that it lacks trustworthiness for two 
basic reasons: (i) the person who purports to know the facts is 
not stating them under oath; (ii) that person is not present for 
cross-examination). 
Accordingly, none of the findings in the Bailey pro-
ceeding have been established by the "clear and convincing" 
standard imposed by the Bar's own rules of procedure. As such, 
all of the Findings in this proceeding must be vacated. 
B. Many of The Findings Are Clearly Erroneous. 
In asking the Court to set aside a number of the 
Findings on the basis that they are clearly erroneous, Calder 
recognizes his obligation to: 
[M]arshal all of the evidence in support of 
the trial court's findings and to then 
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demonstrate even when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the factual determinations 
made by the trial court, that the evidence is 
insufficient to support its findings. 
Harline v. Campbell, 720 P.2d 980f 982 (Utah 1986). This burden 
is discharged below. 
1. Finding No. 1(a); 
Mr. Bailey originally retained [Calder] to 
file a bankruptcy in 1978. Problems arose in 
this bankruptcy respecting the discharge of a 
certain judgment debt which precluded Mr. 
Bailey from obtaining a Utah driver's 
license. 
The only evidence in the record tending to support this Finding 
is as follows: 
Q. I am sorry. Let me ask you to resume your 
testimony. Tell us the circumstances under 
which you sought to renew your driver's 
license. What happened? 
A. I went down to the Driver's Bureau on my 
birthday, took the test and eye test and was 
just about given my license when a lady 
punched the computer and said I had a finan-
cial judgment against me. 
(Tr. 35, lines 16-22). 
After Bailey informed Calder of his conversation with the unspec-
ified "lady" at the Driver's Bureau, Calder wrote a letter to the 
Bureau informing it of his recollection that the purported 
judgment debt had been discharged in bankruptcy. (Trial Ex. 
B-4). An additional reference to the purported judgment is found 
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at Tr. 307-311. However, it is devoid of any additional testi-
mony tending to corroborate even remotely the accuracy of the 
hearsay evidence. 
Thus, Finding No. 1(a) is founded solely on hearsay 
evidence, far short of being "clear and convincing." If the 
Court determines to strike it for that reason, there is no 
further evidentiary support for it. As such the finding is 
clearly erroneous and cannot be sustained. 
2* Finding No. K b ) ; 
In or about October 1983, [Calder] entered 
into an engagement with Mr. Bailey, arranged 
through Bar Counsel, C. Jeffrey Paoletti, to 
resolve an investigation of a disciplinary 
complaint filed by Mr. Bailey against 
[Calder]. By this engagement, [Calder] 
agreed that he would obtain an amendment to 
Mr. Bailey's bankruptcy schedule and obtain a 
discharge for Mr. Bailey of a judgment debt 
owed by Mr. Bailey to Richard D. and Morren 
C. Harris in the sum of about $1,400. 
The only evidence even remotely tending to support this Finding 
is found at Tr. 122-25. However, that testimony nowhere estab-
lishes that Calder ever entered into an engagement with Bailey. 
Rather, the evidence establishes Paoletti's impression that 
H And, as demonstrated in Argument II supra, even if the pur-
ported judgment had been listed on Bailey's bankruptcy schedule 
and thereby been discharged, that fact alone would not have per-
mitted Bailey to obtain a Utah driver's license as this Finding 
seems to suggest. 
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Calder would obtain an amendment to Bailey's bankruptcy schedules 
for a fee of $10.00 and that Paoletti would write a letter to 
Bailey reflecting Paoletti's understanding. (id.; Trial Ex. 
B-12). Notably, however, the record is devoid of any evidence 
that Paoletti ever provided Calder with a copy of the letter 
reflecting Paoletti's understanding of the agreement. The record 
establishes only an agreement between Paoletti and Bailey to 
which Calder was never privy. 
In addition, the Finding inaccurately recites that it 
was Paoletti who "arranged" the so-called "engagement." Indeed, 
the evidence establishes that it was Calder who volunteered, with 
no pressure from the Bar, to attempt to resolve the problem: 
At that time the screening panel determined 
that the [Bailey] complaint was not timely 
filed, based on the statute of limitations 
and, therefore, determined that it would be 
dismissed for that reason. But in the 
hearing, when Mr. Calder appeared, Mr. Calder 
volunteered, said that he would proceed with 
amending the schedules and getting the matter 
taken care of. 
(Tr. 122). The Panel's omission of this fact appears calculated 
to give the inaccurate impression that the impetus for the 
engagement came from the Bar's counsel and not Calder. 
3. Finding No. 1(c): 
"[Calder] agreed to complete the engagement 
and achieve the objective upon Mr. Bailey's 
paying $10.00 for additional attorney's fees; 
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Mr. Bailey made said payment of $10.00 to 
[Calder]." 
The only evidence tending to support this finding is again found 
at pages 122-24 of Mr. Paelotti's testimony. Interestingly, 
Paoletti starts his testimony by indicating that Calder informed 
him that "we need $10.00 to cover the costs." (Tr. 122) (Emphasis 
added). On the following page, however, Paoletti states his 
understanding that the $10.00 was the total "fee" for the service 
(Tr. 123). Then, several pages later, Paoletti confesses that he 
really doesn't know whether the $10.00 was required as a filing 
fee or as an attorney's fee: 
I recall when Mr. Calder was in, that he 
said—that he basically proposed that for a 
$10.00 fee, for whatever reason he needed the 
$10.00 for filing fee or whatever, that he 
would resolve this matter. 
(Tr. 130)(Emphasis added). Paoletti's inability to recall the 
precise charges for which Calder was willing to complete the 
"engagement" is consistent with his earlier admission that he did 
not " . . .have a clear recollection of all of the events." (Tr. 
121). Finally, Paoletti's obvious confusion is highlighted by 
the fact that at page 125 of his testimony, he states that 
" . . .the resolution at the end of that conversation was that he 
[Calder] was to take an additional $15," for costs but that he 
was not prepared to waive any attorney's fees to solve the 
problem. 
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These inconsistencies in Paoletti's testimony are 
neither hypertechnical nor academic. For the Panel is seeking to 
sanction Calder in part for his failure to adhere to the terms of 
the "engagement." If the contours of the "engagement" were 
unclear or confusing to Paoletti, it hardly seems appropriate to 
sanction Calder for his failure to understand or follow its 
terms, especially where Paoletti never provided Calder with a 
copy of the confirming letter Paoletti sent to Bailey. 
Viewed in the light most favorable to Finding No. 1(c) , 
the evidence underlying the Finding can stand for no more than 
the proposition that Paoletti and Calder never had a clear, 
common understanding regarding the terms and conditions on which 
the "engagement" would go forward. By determining (or at least 
certainly implying) that the "engagement" was cast in reasonably 
and clear and intelligible terms which Calder should have under-
stood, Finding No. 1(c) takes indecent liberties with the evi-
dence. 
4. Finding No. 1(d). 
"After accepting the engagement and agreeing 
upon the fee to be charged, [Calder] demanded 
additional money from Mr. Bailey, in the 
amount of $120.00, in order to initiate the 
engagement. Mr. Bailey complained to Mr. 
Paoletti about this additional fee." 
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The record establishes that after the initial "agreement" for 
Calder to take the engagement for $10.00 as a "filing fee or 
whatever," see Tr. 130, Calder discovered that Bailey's bank-
ruptcy files had been closed by the court clerk and shipped to a 
central filing office in Denver, Colorado. (Tr. 124-5, 329). 
The additional court imposed cost to reopen the case would be 
$50.00. (Tr. 329; Trial Ex. B-15). The remaining $70.00 of the 
$120.00 amount Calder quoted was for his attorney's fees, see 
Trial Ex. B-15, — fees which Paoletti himself conceded were 
never waived by Calder. (Tr. 125). Paolettifs testimony on this 
point could not be clearer: 
Q. Did Mr. Calder during this telephone 
conversation tell you that he would take care 
of the problem for an additional $15? 
A. That's my recollection. 
Q. Did he mention anything to you at that 
time about a fee of $100? 
A. Well I remember—yes. We talked about a 
fee. Whether it was $100 specifically or 
not, I don't remember. But I do remember he 
talked about a fee that he thought he should 
be paid for the additional work that he was 
doing. But the resolution at the end of that 
conversation was that he was to take an 
additional $15.00. 
Q. Did you understand that he was prepared 
to waive any such fees to get the problem 
done? 
A. Well, that wasn't my understanding." 
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(Tr. 125, lines 5-19)(Emphasis added). 
Therefore, contrary to the Panel's finding that Calder 
"agreed upon the [lesser] fee [of $15.00] to be charged," the 
testimony of the Bar's own former counsel is that Calder never 
agreed to waive the fee and thereby confine it to $15.00. 
Accordingly, there is no support for the Finding's apparent 
implication that Calder acted improperly in "demanding additional 
money from Mr. Bailey." 
5. Finding No. 1(e); 
"Subsequent to the October 1983 engagement, 
numerous communications were exchanged 
between Mr. Bailey and [Calder], and between 
[Calder] and Bar Counsel which concluded with 
[Calder's] reaffirming his agreement to 
continue representing Mr. Bailey in amending 
the bankruptcy schedules. Mr. Bailey paid an 
additional $15.00 to [Calder], at [Calder's] 
request in furtherance of the engagement." 
This finding is misleading insofar as it omits any mention of Mr. 
Paoletti's recollection that Calder was not " . . .prepared to 
waive any such fees to get the problem done." (Tr. 125). 
Therefore, while there is certainly some evidence that Calder 
reaffirmed his agreement to continue representing Bailey in 
amending his bankruptcy schedules, there is no support for the 
Panel's apparent assumption that Calder ever agreed to do so by 
waiving his attorney's fees or that he later acted improperly in 
withdrawing from the case when those fees were not paid. 
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6. Finding No, 1(g): 
"Though [Calder] presented conflicting 
evidence as to the agreement, the Panel 
accepted former Bar Counsel C. Jeffrey 
Paoletti's testimony as the most credible 
evidence of [Calder1s] agreement to represent 
Mr, Bailey in amending his bankruptcy." 
This finding suffers from the obvious, previously discussed 
defects that Paoletti confessed to the sketchy nature of his 
recollection of the "agreement" and that his testimony as to what 
the "agreement" was is hopelessly contradictory. (See pp. 30, 31 
above). 
7. Finding No. 1(h); 
[Calder] filed a Motion to Reopen Mr. 
Bailey's case, but the Motion was inadequate 
on its face." 
Calder frankly acknowledged at trial that the Motion to Reopen 
was not complete and would need to be supplemented. (Tr. 
529-30). Calder's explanation for filing the motion in that form 
was that "we had to put [in] a lot of other things and we had to 
get the file from Denver." (Tr. 529) The Barfs finding, how-
ever, omits any mention of the justification advanced by Calder 
and seeks to create the impression that Calder recklessly and 
heedlessly filed papers calculated to injure his own clients. 
Thus, when properly reviewed in context, this Finding cannot 
support the imposition of disciplinary sanctions. 
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8. Finding No, 1(i): 
"After filing the Motion [to Reopen Bailey1s 
bankruptcy case] with the Bankruptcy Court, 
[Calder] failed to follow through with his 
representation of Mr. Bailey by failing to 
schedule the Motion to Reopen for hearing and 
by failing to present the Motion to the judge 
for consideration." 
The record reflects that after Calder filed the motion to reopen 
in January, 1984 — a motion which he knew would have to be 
supplemented with information that he had ordered from the 
Bankruptcy Court's central filing office in Denver, Colorado — 
Calder refrained from noticing it up for hearing. (Tr. 529). 
Before this information was received from the Denver office and 
incorporated in the motion then on file, the bankruptcy court sua 
sponte denied the motion without prejudice. (Trial Ex. B-19). 
Moreover, what the Finding fails to reflect is that after the 
court denied the motion, Bailey's successor counsel was success-
ful in having the purportedly omitted debt discharged in bank-
ruptcy. (Tr. 57). 
9. Finding No. l(i): 
"The Motion to Reopen was denied, and, 
immediately upon learning of the court's 
order, [Calder] withdrew from representing 
Mr. Bailey. At no time after February 16, 
1984, did [Calder] make any effort to obtain 
substitute counsel for Bailey, return the 
$10.00 paid by Bailey, refund any portion of 
the original attorney's fees and costs paid 
by Bailey for the Chapter 7, take any steps 
with the Department of Motor Vehicles to 
-43-
assist Bailey to obtain a driverfs license 
or, in any other way, assist Bailey in 
achieving the desired objective." 
There are several evidentiary deficiencies in this Finding. 
First, the Finding fails to mention the reason why Calder with-
drew as Bailey's counsel, namely, that upon learning of the 
court's action, Bailey berated Calder's office staff. (Tr. 356; 
12 
Trial Ex. B-20). Second, the evidence is devoid of any indica-
tion that Bailey ever asked Calder to assist him in obtaining 
substitute counsel. Indeed, the record does reflect that shortly 
after the motion to reopen was denied without prejudice, Bailey's 
new counsel obtained the requested relief. (Trial Exhibit B-22; 
Tr. 57). Third, the only evidence in the record regarding 
whether Bailey's $10.00 payment was refunded is inconclusive. 
The only testimony on that issue is as follows: 
Q. And that money has never been tendered 
back to Mr. Bailey, has it? 
A. I've been thinking about that for the 
last six or seven months. To be honest with 
you, I don't know whether it was tendered 
back. I don't know where the money is now. 
I can't really remember the $10. I could 
have sent it back to him. I just don't 
really know." 
!2 Bailey did deny that he ever became agitated at Calder's sec-
retary. (Tr. 99). However, there is no evidence that he ever 
took issue with, or otherwise responded to, Calder's claim in th-e 
letter of February 16, 1984 (Trial Ex. B-20) that his behavior 
was n . . . too offensive for my secretaries and myself. 
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(Tr. 326, lines 13-19). Notably, the record is devoid of any 
testimony by Mr. Bailey regarding whether this fee was ever 
refunded. 
Fourth, while it is true that Calder never refunded any 
portion of the original attorney's fees and costs which Bailey 
paid to him in 1978—some six years before Calder ultimately 
withdrew—it is difficult to understand how the Panel could 
believe such an obligation existed in light of the Bar's decision 
in 1983 to dismiss Bailey's complaint as being barred by the 
statute of limitations. It is only because Calder unilaterally 
volunteered to assist Bailey in amending his schedules to reflect 
the allegedly omitted judgment debt that any duty to refund 
attorney's fees could even arguably arise. Clearly, this duty 
could be no broader than the scope of legal services that Calder 
was performing after he assumed the obligation to amend Bailey's 
bankruptcy schedules; it could not extend to legal services 
performed before that voluntary commitment was made. 
10. Finding No. l(k); 
On or about April 16, 1984, [Calder], being 
under oath, prepared, signed and filed an 
affidavit in the case of Bailey v. Calder, 
Civil No. C85-800, then pending in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, wherein [Calder] knowingly and 
intentionally made the following misrepresen-
tations and false statements: 
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1) That after Judge Mabey had origi-
nally granted an application to reopen Mr. 
Bailey's case, the client was "to pay a 
$60.00 filing fee to the court and also a 
$10.00 fee to add the creditor that he had 
omitted, when, in fact, there was no such 
financial arrangement at that time; 
2) That after 1979, [Calder] had not 
had any contact with Bailey until 1982 when, 
in fact Bailey had contacted [Calder] on 
several occasions prior to that date; 
3) That [Calder] did not represent 
Bailey as his attorney in 1982 inasmuch as 
Bailey had refused to pay anything to 
[Calder] as requested, when, in fact, 
[Calder] had written to Bailey in 1982 
advising Bailey that [Calder] was proceeding 
with this case; 
4) That he had agreed to help Mr. 
Bailey in 1983 at the request of the Utah 
State Bar but that nothing more was done 
because Bailey refused to pay money when, in 
fact, Bailey had paid, in full, all the money 
requested pursuant to the agreement; 
5) That in 1983 he was not representing 
Mr. Bailey because Bailey had not paid his 
retainer fee and had "paid no money to [him]" 
when, in fact, Bailey had paid all fees 
required under the agreement; and 
6) That at no time after 1978 had 
[Calder] represented Bailey in any bankruptcy 
matters, when, in fact, he had represented 
Bailey, had advised Bailey about bankruptcy 
matters, and had filed motions for Bailey as 
Bailey's attorney both in 1979 and in 1984. 
(a) Finding No. l(k)(3). Calder's statement in 
the affidavit that he did not represent 
Bailey in 1982 is factually incorrect. 
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However, there is no evidence that the 
inaccurate statement was made "knowingly and 
intentionally/1 as found by the Panel. 
(b) Finding No. l(k)(4). In light of the discus-
sion at pages 36-45 supra, Calder1s statement 
in the affidavit that Calder refrained from 
taking further action pending Bailey's 
payment of additional attorney's fees is 
factually accurate. 
(c) Finding No. l(k)(5). While Calder was 
mistaken in asserting that he did not repre-
sent Bailey in 1983, Calderfs statement in 
the affidavit that Bailey had not paid his 
retainer fee isf in light of the discussion 
at pages 36-45 supraf correct. 
11. Finding No. K m ) : 
"When [Calder] filed a personal Chapter 13 on 
February 23f 1984, he did not list Bailey as 
a creditor even though, at that time, 
[Calder] knew that he was required to list 
all known and contingent liabilities and also 
knew that Bailey probably had a claim against 
him for his failure to comply with the terms 
of the agreement to achieve the desired 
objective. [Calder] did not seek to amend 
his 1984 Chapter 13 to add Bailey as a 
creditor until January 31, 1986 even though, 
as early as February 1985 [Calder] knew that 
Bailey had filed a malpractice action against 
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him in the Third Judicial District Court, 
Civil No. C85-800." 
The only direct evidence regarding whether Calder knew or should 
have known that Bailey had a claim against him in his own Chapter 
13 contradicts this finding. The record is as follows: 
Q. Did you think he [Bailey] had any claim 
against you or any cause to be concerned 
about your services? 
A. No, did not. 
Q. You did not? 
A. Did not. 
(Tr. 358, lines 3-9). In addition, Calder, like any debtor in 
bankruptcy, had an incentive to list the greatest number of 
possible claimants so that any conceivable debt would be dis-
charged or paid on a compromised basis in his Chapter 13 plan. 
It would make no sense for Calder to knowingly refrain from 
enumerating all possible claims if the effect of the omission was 
to prevent the claim from being discharged in bankruptcy. As a 
corollary to this proposition, it is impossible for Bailey to 
validly contend that he was prejudiced in any way by Calderfs 
omission of him as a creditor or potential creditor, because so 
long as the purported debt was omitted, it remained in full force 
and effect for Baileyfs benefit. 
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Finally, the Finding is devoid of any mention that 
Bailey's malpractice action against Calder was dismissed with 
prejudice at the conclusion of Bailey's case in chief at trial. 
(Tr. 7). 
12. Finding No. l(o): 
[Calder1s] 1984 Chapter 13 case was dismissed 
by Judge Allen on July 31, 1986, as having 
been filed in bad faith. The court's order 
of dismissal is final and non-appealable. No 
credible evidence was presented to indicate 
that the dismissal of [Calder's] 1984 Chapter 
13 was for reasons other than that it was 
filed in bad faith or that the Bankruptcy 
Court had any reason to dismiss the case 
other than on the merits as set forth in 
Judge Allen's ruling of July 30, 1986. 
The obvious problem with this Finding is that it is based on the 
transcript of Judge Allen's five-page ruling from the bench. 
(See Trial Ex. B-37). Significantly, the Finding is not based 
upon any of the underlying evidence supposedly relied upon by 
Judge Allen to support the ruling. As such, the Finding violates 
the salutary principle of In Re Strong supra, 616 P.2d at 583 
that the Bar must do more than simply . . . adopt the findings of 
some other tribunal . . .," and must introduce the evidentiary 
record generated in the prior proceeding. JEd. at 587. Accord-
ingly, this finding must be set aside and the issues remanded to 
the Panel with instructions to adduce the underlying transcript 
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and afford Calder an opportunity to explain and rebut the testi-
mony contained in the transcript. 
13. Finding No. l(p): 
Mr. Bailey was unable to obtain employment 
for a substantial period of time due to his 
inability to obtain a driver's license. 
As demonstrated in Argument II supraf this finding appears to be 
based upon the erroneous premise that obtaining a discharge of 
the judgment would automatically have allowed Bailey to obtain a 
renewed driver's license. The Panel's misapprehension of the 
substantive law governing this issue improperly induced an 
erroneous factual finding. 
14. Finding No. 2(b): 
At the time [Calder] agreed to file a Chapter 
7 case for Mr. and Mrs. Jobf [Calder] knew 
that (1) Mr. Job was a plaintiff in a lawsuit 
entitled Job, et al. v. Pocklington, et al., 
which was then pending in the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah, 
Civil No. C82-1085Cf (2) Mr. Job was seeking 
a substantial amount of money and damages, in 
excess of $1,000,000 in such suit, (3) the 
cause of action had to be listed as an asset 
in Job's Chapter 7 case, and (4) Job wanted 
the asset listed in his Chapter 7 case. 
Notwithstanding this knowledge, [Calder] did 
not take reasonable steps and precautions to 
insure that this cause of action was properly 
scheduled and listed in Job's Chapter 7 case. 
The evidence supporting this finding consists primarily of Job's 
testimony at pages 138-149 of the trial transcript. On page 145, 
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Job testifies that he " . . . talked to [Calder] about [the 
Pocklington case], and he wrote it down on a piece of paper" and 
that " • . . there was documentation there in his handwriting 
that I gave the asset to him." And, on page 146 of the tran-
script, Job stated that "he [Calder] made sure that he wrote a 
note and was going to take care of that situation." Job's 
testimony establishes, therefore, that he provided Calder with 
some information regarding his claim against Pocklington. 
However, Calderfs testimony was that "the way Job gave 
it to me he had a possible claim against the Pacific Coast League 
for defamation of Peter Pocklington. The value undetermined." 
(Tr. 196, 406). It is difficult to imagine why Calder would have 
characterized the claim as a "possible" claim whose value was 
"undetermined" if Job had actually informed him that the claim 
was embodied by a lawsuit for which specified damages were being 
sought. Indeed, under cross examination, Job acknowledged that 
he refrained from providing "many details" to Calder. That 
testimony is as follows: 
Q.: "All right. You indicated that you, I 
believe, in your previous testimony, that you 
had gotten that [a copy of Job's bankruptcy 
schedule] from going to Mr. Calder!s and 
getting a copy of that document; is that 
correct? 
A.: Yesf I did. 
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Q.: Does that fairly reflect what you told 
Mr. Calder about the Peter Pocklington 
matter? 
A.: Wellf there was more. I told him I was 
a stockholder in the Great Northern Baseball 
Corporation, I told him I was one of the 
major stockholders of the Ogden A's Baseball 
Club. 
Q.: All right. The item in [Calder's 
handwritten note of his first meeting with 
Job] as it reads is: "As a possible claim of 
the Pacific Coast League for defamation of 
Peter Pocklington, value undetermined." What 
did you tell him about the details of that 
claim? 
A.: I didn't go into that many details, Mr. 
Boone. 
(Tr. page 195, lines 17-25, page 196, lines 1-7). 
At the very most, therefore, the record establishes 
only that Job provided Calder with some information regarding a 
possible claim that he had against Pocklington. It nowhere 
establishes that Job ever mentioned that the Pocklington Case was 
in fact in litigation; that Calder was ever informed of the 
amount of damages sought in the Pocklington Case; that Calder was 
ever provided with any papers generated in the Pocklington Case; 
or, that Calder was ever informed of the identity of any counsel 
in the Pocklington Case. (Tr. 196, 199, 200). The Panel took a 
quantum leap in converting that testimony into a formal finding 
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that Calder knew that the claim was embodied by a formal lawsuit 
and was worth in excess of $lf000,000. 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
affirmance of the Finding, the most that can be said for it is 
that Calder was inattentive to the actual dimensions of the claim 
and should not have accepted at face value Job's description of 
the claim. The evidence falls far short of establishing Calderfs 
actual knowledge of the structure and value of the claim and his 
willful nondisclosure of that knowledge, as suggested by Finding 
No. 2(b). 
15. Finding No. 2(c): 
At the time [Calder] recommended that Job 
file a Chapter 7, he did not discuss with Job 
the option of filing under Chapter 13
 f and 
did not mention any additional advantages 
which Job might realize if he elected to 
proceed under Chapter 13. 
The only evidence in the record pertaining to this issue directly 
contradicts this finding. Calder testified as follows: 
Q.: Did you discuss with him [Job] . . . 
A.: On April 25th — 
Q.: — the possibilities of filing a 
Chapter 13 on October 19f 1983 when he came 
in to see you? 
A.: There had been some discussions in 1983 
when he came in with the Chapter 7 at that 
time. He had wanted to know — if he was 
behind in his house payments. He had prob-
lems with that and he wanted to know what 
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would happen in the future if he filed the 
Chapter 7 now, and later on he had problems 
with his house if he could file a Chapter 13. 
There had been a discussion on Chapter 13 in 
the future, sometime in the future. 
(Tr. 428 lines 6-17). Job's own testimony on that point is 
something less than a resounding contradiction of Calder1s: 
Q.: Did he [Calder] mention Chapter 13 as a 
possible source of relief? 
A.: Not at the time that I filed my Chapter 
7; or at least I don't recall that he did. 
The foregoing evidence falls far short of clearly and convinc-
ingly establishing that Calder never mentioned to Job the option 
of filing a Chapter 13 at the time he was initially retained. As 
such, this finding must be stricken. 
16. Finding No. 2(d): 
Subsequently, on or about April 27, 1984
 f 
[Calder] rather than seeking to amend the 
Chapter 7 schedules, filed a Chapter 13 
proceeding, for which Mr. Job paid [Calder] 
an additional $150.00, even though, in giving 
this advice, [Calder] knew or should have 
known, that: 
1. The Chapter 13 was likely to be 
dismissed as a "bad faith filing" 
in light of Job's previous dis-
charge under Chapter 7; 
2. Job could not "save his home" under 
the Chapter 13 unless he had 
regular income for which to make 
payments; 
3. The Chapter 13 would be ineffective 
unless the previous discharge of 
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the Chapter 7 was revoked or 
vacated; and 
4. Job would not obtain a discharge 
under his Chapter 13 case until he 
had successfully completed all 
payments under the plan. 
To understand the fallacies of this Finding, it is important to 
note that in the Chapter 13 plan that Calder proposed for Job, 
Calder specifically stated that Job's previous Chapter 7 dis-
charge was to be revoked. (Tr. 423-24). As such, the proposed 
filing of the Chapter 13 plan on the heels of the earlier Chapter 
7 plan was not " . . . likely to be dismissed as a "bad faith 
filing". Bankruptcy Judge Judith A. Boulden's testimony on that 
point could not be clearer: 
Q.: At the time that the 13 was filed, do 
you recall if there was problem with 13 being 
filed on the heels of a 7? 
A.: Yes, I do recall there was a problem. 
Q.: Okay. What was that problem? 
A.: There is no specific statutory prohibi-
tion to what we term in the trade as Chapter 
20. That means that a person can go through 
a Chapter 7 and obtain a discharge and turn 
around on the heels of that 7 and file a 
Chapter 13 in order to deal with those kinds 
of debts that may not be dischargeable under 
Chapter 7 - student loans, child support, 
alimony, perhaps mortgage arrearages, or some 
unsecured debt that may - the debtor may wish 
to reaffirm. 
It at this time was an important issue 
nationwide because there was no statutory 
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prohibition against it except to the extent 
that a debtor is required to file a plan in 
good faith and there was case law coming down 
at that time indicating that that change of 
events, if it were intentional and if it was 
a design or an artifice to avoid paying 
unsecured creditors, would render a plan 
non-confirmable because it was filed in good 
faith and that was an issue at that time, and 
still an issue probably. 
Q.: Was there a way around that problem if 
you did certain things? 
A.: Yes, There are a number of ways that 
the — evil could be remedied. You could 
request to have the Chapter 7 discharge 
revoked, thus, legally reinstating all the 
debt that had been discharged, bringing all 
the debt into the Chapter 13 case and then 
pay it, pay a portion or all of it. 
Legally that is certainly the preferable 
way to do it, because it legally reinstates 
all the debt.w 
(Tr. page 635, line 6-25, page 636 lines 1-14). Thus, so long as 
the previous Chapter 7 discharge was revoked (as Calder's Chapter 
13 plan for Job so provided), the subsequent Chapter 13 filing 
was never likely to be dismissed as a "bad faith filing," as 
suggested in Finding No. 2(d). 
Next, there is no evidence in the record that a precon-
dition to the filing of a Chapter 13 was the debtor's receipt of 
a "regular income with which to make payments." Indeed, Judge 
Boulden testified just the opposite: 
Q.: You in testimony spoke about the funding 
of plans and looking for regular income. Is 
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it possible to file a Chapter 13 proceeding 
without at the time of filing having regular 
income? 
A.: Wellf there is a legal issue as to 
whether or not the original filing the debtor 
has income at that time or whether its income 
as of the confirmation of the plan. There is 
a split of opinion regarding that. 
Q.: Okay. If — for a hypothetical assuming 
that a debtor knew he was going to work next 
week, had a guaranteed job, would it be 
possible to file a 13 based on that prospec-
tive income? 
A.: Well, it's often done and there may be 
other parties who pay the Chapter 13 payment 
even. 
Q.: Have you seen plans confirmed where they 
were initially filed on a prospective 
[income] basis? 
A.: Yes. 
(Tr. 690, lines 13-25, page 691, lines 1-4). In the face of this 
testimony, the Panel explicitly announced during its decision 
that it could not sanction Calder on this issue. It recognized 
that: 
There are two areas where the Panel was not 
convinced by the appropriate standard that in 
fact there were problems. One of those was 
the filings for Mr. Job of a Chapter 13. The 
allegation of the Bar being that there was no 
source of income by which one could appropri-
ately make that kind of a filing. There was 
some testimony that there could be a prospec-
tive income. The Panel was just not con-
vinced that that was, by the appropriate 
standard, improper. 
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(Tr. 1061). Accordingly, the Panel's inclusion of Finding No. 
2(d)(2) was improper. 
Finally, there is no evidence in the record supporting 
the Panel's finding that Calder failed to inform Job that he 
would not obtain a discharge under his Chapter 13 case until he 
had successfully completed all payments under the plan. More-
over, this finding is completely irrelevant to any evidence in 
the record because the bankruptcy court's ultimate decision to 
dismiss the Chapter 13 case was in no way predicated on Job's 
inability to complete all required payments; rather, it was 
predicated on the fact that Job failed and refused — over the 
concerns and objections of Calder — to attend the first meeting 
of creditors (Tr. 506, 703). 
17. Finding No. 2(e); 
[Calder] withdrew from representing Mr. Job 
in July 1984, without Mr. Job's consent and 
knowledge. At the time of his withdrawal 
[Calder] knew that it would be difficult for 
Mr. Job to obtain substitute counsel to 
resist the Chapter 13 Trustee's pending 
motion for dismissal. 
More than any other of the Panel's determinations, this finding 
so grossly mischaracterizes the underlying evidence as to call 
into question the competence of the Panel. Under questioning by 
the Bar's prosecutor, Job initially testified that Calder's 
motion to withdraw was dated July 3, 1984 (Tr. 161). At that 
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point, the prosecutor leadingly asked "Isn't it the 31st day of 
July?" id. In response to that suggestion, Job changed his 
testimony by stating "Yes. 31st day. Excuse me. I can't tell 
whether the last one is a one or what it is." id. Then, appar-
ently recognizing that the date reflected on the mailing certifi-
cate was actually July 3, the Bar's prosecutor stated "It does 
state — the mailing certificate indicates it's dated July 3." 
Id. Obviously confused by this point, Job then opines "All I 
know is that it says July 30, 1984 and it was mailed that day, I 
guess." (Ijd.) This is the only "evidence" in the record that 
Calder's motion to withdraw was mailed on any date after July 3, 
1984. The evidence that it was actually mailed on July 3, 1984 
is overwhelming: 
Q.: When did you become aware of the fact 
that Mr. Calder desired to withdraw from your 
case, then? 
A.: I don't know whether it was this docu-
ment [the motion to withdraw] or whether it 
was — I really don't know. I must have 
received it in the mail, but I am just not 
familiar with the document. I see what it 
says there. I see what I had — 
Q.: Was that your address at the time, 4046 
West Lake — 
A.: Yes, it was. 
Q.: And the mailing on that is on the 3rd of 
July; is that correct? 
A.: Yes. 
-59-
(Tr. 238). 
Q.: Did he tell you prior to that [the 
trustee's motion to dismiss the Chapter 13 
case] that he was going to withdraw? 
A.: Nof he did not. He just — I got that 
in the mail. 
Q.: When was the first time you found out he 
was withdrawing as your lawyer? 
A.: I don't know. I really can't remember 
the dates, Mr. Leta. I know the dates are 
there, but I can't remember the exact dates. 
(Tr. 160). 
Q.: Okay. Now had you made a determination 
about whether or not you were going to 
continue to represent Mr. Job at that time? 
A.: I can't remember the exact precise date 
when I decided, but I remember sitting down 
thinking for about an hour and a half and 
decided — that I did not want to represent 
him because he would not do what I told him 
to do, so I filed that Motion dated July 3rd 
and the hearing was set for August 6th. 
Q.: Okay. Did you circulate the motion on 
Mr. Job and Ms. Boulden? 
A.: Yes, I did. 
Q.: The motion to withdraw? 
A.: Yes, I did. 
Q.: Was he — were you allowed to withdraw 
by the Judge? 
A.: Yes. Judge Allen allowed me to withdraw 
because he [Job] wouldn't do what I told him 
to do. 
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(Tr. 508-9). 
Therefore, the record clearly establishes that Job 
received Calderfs motion to withdraw at least one month before 
the scheduled hearing on the trustee's motion to dismiss the 
Chapter 13 petition. Notably, at the August 8, 1984 hearing on 
whether that petition should be dismissed, Job's trustee vividly 
recalls that Job consented to that action. The court inquired 
" . . . if that's what he wanted done and he [Job] said, 'Yes.'" 
(Tr. 634). 
Finally, there is no evidence to support the Finding 
that Calder knew that it would be difficult for Job to obtain 
substitute counsel. Therefore, this Finding must be vacated in 
13 its entirety. 
18. Finding No. 2(g); 
On or about August 8, 1984, the Chapter 13 
was dismissed and the Chapter 7 vacated, with 
a result that Mr. Job did not obtain any 
relief under any Bankruptcy Chapter. 
(Emphasis added.) 
This Finding is misleading insofar as it states that Job obtained 
no relief under any bankruptcy chapter. For it completely 
ignores the obvious fact that during the time period the Chapter 
" For that reason, Finding No. 2(f) to the effect that Calder 
made no effort to assist Job in obtaining substitute counsel is 
similarly without merit. 
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7 petition was in effect—October 1983 to August 1984—Job 
undeniably obtained relief. This Finding's suggestion that he 
did not is clearly erroneous. 
19. Finding No. 2(h): 
Thereafter, unable to afford new bankruptcy 
counsel, Mr. Job filed a Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy, pro se, in an attempt to prevent 
foreclosure proceedings on the Jobs1 home; 
the Chapter 11 filing was late and the home 
was lost. 
This Finding is clearly erroneous insofar as it seeks to impose 
on Calder responsibility for the loss of the Jobs' home. The 
record reflects that after engaging new counsel, Job was informed 
by that counsel on the very morning of the trustee's sale that 
the Chapter 11 petition would not be filed unless and until 
certain additional attorneys' fees were paid. (Tr. 169). Job 
was unable to timely pay the quoted fees. Id. As a result, his 
Chapter 11 petition was filed several minutes after the trustee's 
sale was conducted. (Tr. 169-70). Mr. Job's testimony could not 
be clearer: 
Q.: Did you attempt to retain counsel [to 
file a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition]? 
A.: Yes, I did. 
Q.: Did you have any luck? 
A.: I talked to an attorney, Mr. Charles 
Brown. Mr. Brown said that he would file a 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy for me and told me to 
come to his office at a certain date. It was 
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the date that the filing had to be done. It 
was something like ten in the morning or 
eleven in the morning — ten something in the 
morning and when I got to Mr, Brown's office, 
Mr. Brown said that he decided that I would 
have to have $300 to $500 before he would go 
ahead and take the bankruptcy onf but he said 
that he would prepare the initial papers that 
I would need at that time to file a Chapter 
II bankruptcy. But, by the time Mr. Brown 
got the papers ready, and they weren't ready 
when I got there in the morning — I had to 
go to the bank and cash a check that I was to 
give Mr. Brown. 
By that time I was a certain amount of 
minutes late in filing the bankruptcy, 
because they were going to have a sale on our 
home. 
(Tr. 169). 
Therefore the Panel's effort to attribute to Calder 
responsibility for the loss of Job's home — a loss that occurred 
month after Calder withdrew as Job's counsel — is clearly 
erroneous. 
20. Finding No. 2(i); 
At no time after July 1984, did [Calder] seek 
to amend his 1984 personal Chapter 13 case to 
list Job as a creditor even though he knew 
Job had claims against him for malpractice 
and had filed a lawsuit on September 11, 1984 
in the Third Judicial District Court, Civil 
No. C84-5436, asserting such claims. 
Calder admitted at the Bar trial that he never amended his 1984 
personal Chapter 13 case to list Job as a creditor. The only 
direct evidence regarding the reason for that failure was 
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Calder's testimony that he mistakenly thought that Job's claim 
constituted a post-petition debt which could not be discharged in 
bankruptcy. (Tr. 442-45f 512, 779-81)• 
Accordingly, Calder refrained from informing the state 
court of the imposition of the automatic stay until February, 
1986. The Finding, however, fails to address the obvious issue 
of why a debtor operating under a confirmed plan would have any 
incentive not to disclose the existence of all creditors of which 
he was aware, since that failure would preclude the debtor from 
obtaining any relief from the debt owed to the creditor. 
21. Finding No. 2(k): 
On or about July 16, 1985, at a time Mr. Job 
was moving for Summary Judgment in the 
pending malpractice action, [Calder] filed a 
Motion to Reopen Job's Chapter 11 proceeding, 
solely with the intent to harass, injure and 
annoy Mr. Job; no valid basis existed for 
filing the motion and the motion asserted 
matters upon which [Calder] had no basis to 
make such allegations; in that respect, 
[Calder] knowingly and intentionally made the 
following false or misleading statements: 
(1) That he was a creditor of Job when, in 
fact, he had never submitted a bill, previ-
ously demanded payment, or counterclaimed in 
the civil action for the payment of any 
attorney's fees; 
(2) That the Jobs had intentionally omitted 
creditors from their Chapter 11 case when, in 
fact, [Calder] knew that the claims of such 
creditors were contingent and disputed by the 
debtors; 
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(3) That the Jobs had omitted a debt to a 
family member in the amount of $35,000 when, 
in factf [Calder] had no reasonable basis for 
asserting such omission1 
(4) That the debtor's Chapter 7 schedules 
filed in 1983 had shown a gross income in 
1982 of $30,000 when, in fact, the income had 
been earned in 1981; and 
(5) That the Jobs had omitted a substantial 
claim to the Internal Revenue Service in the 
amount of $5,00Q-$1Q,000 when, in fact, 
[Calder] had no reasonable basis for making 
this assertion. 
The difficulty with this Finding is that it ignores any mention 
of the justification advanced by Calder for the filing of the 
affidavit: To discharge his obligation as an officer of the 
court to inform the court that false or otherwise improper 
disclosures were being made by a debtor seeking its protection, 
(Tr. 450). Had Calder failed to bring the issues contained in 
the affidavit to the attention of the court, he would have 
arguably violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. The Panel's 
obvious insensitivity to Calder's reason for filing the affidavit 
and its failure to appreciate the ethical mandates imposed upon 
Calder to take the action he did, requires that this Finding be 
vacated and remanded to the Panel with instructions to rewrite it 
with proper reference to these issues. 
22. Finding No. 2(m); 
In connection with the civil action entitled 
Job v. Calder, Civil No. C84-5436, filed in 
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the Third Judicial District Court of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, [Calder] filed an 
affidavit on about July 18, 1985 wherein 
[Calder] knowingly and intentionally made the 
following misstatements and accusations: 
(1) That Job was responsible for 
failing to list the lawsuit in his schedules 
when, in fact, [Calder] admits that Job 
signed the schedules the lawsuit was listed 
as an asset. 
Although Calder implies in the affidavit that Job was responsible 
for failing to list the Pocklington Case in his bankruptcy 
schedules, Calder also frankly acknowledged in the affidavit 
Job's position that Job . . . signed a copy [of the schedules] 
that contained the lawsuit." (Trial Ex. B-50, paragraphs 1,2,6 
and 9; R. 1613-16). Because Calder acknowledged that fact in the 
affidavit, the Finding's apparent implication that Calder 
impeached himself during the bar trial by admitting that the 
lawsuit was listed as an asset unfairly portrays Calder1s role in 
preparing the affidavit. As such, the Finding is clearly errone-
ous. 
Finding No. 2(m) further provides: 
(2) That there was "some reason to 
think that the debtor may have stolen a key 
from the attorney's desk drawer while he was 
alone in the office and entered the office at 
night and effected certain changes [sic] 
original document that was to be filed with 
the court" when, in fact, [Calder] had no 
facts upon which to base this accusation. 
[Calder] also stated: "Another theory is Mr. 
Job had access to [Calder's] office and 
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perpetrated a fraud upon everybody by substi-
tuting a false paper in the papers to be 
filed with the Court." 
While it is admittedly irresponsible to set forth in an affidavit 
speculative musings as to what may or may not have happened in a 
transaction, it is equally clear that under the applicable rules 
of civil procedure, see Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e), speculation cannot 
be relied upon by the Court to establish or resolve a genuinely 
disputed material issue of fact. As such, the trial court 
undoubtedly attached the weight appropriate to such 
speculation—zero. 
Perhaps most importantly, because Calder frankly 
couched his hypotheses in terms of speculation, and not in terms 
of absolute fact, there is no way he can be found to have know-
ingly and intentionally made misstatements of fact, as suggested 
by this Finding. The law is settled that " . . . the alleged 
false statement must be a statement of fact and not a conclusion, 
opinion or deduction drawn from given facts. That the conclu-
sion, opinion or deduction is erroneous, or is not a correct 
construction or a logical deduction from the facts cannot consti-
tute a false swearing." People v. White, 59 111. 2d 416, 322 
N.E. 2d 1,3 (1974). Accord, 60 Am. Jur. 2d, Perjury, § 8 (1972). 
For this reason alone, the Panel's reliance on the speculative 
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statements in the affidavit is misplaced. The Finding on which 
it is based must be vacated. 
23. Finding No. 2(n): 
The Panel finds those defenses, accusations 
and insinuations made by [Calder] against Job 
to be spurious and indicative of an attitude 
of bad faith which pervades [Calder1s] 
conduct in connection with the Utah State Bar 
disciplinary proceedings and the court 
proceedings. 
It is clearly improper for the Panel to generalize about the 
character of Calder1s conduct from a specific factual finding 
regarding a discreet transaction or occurrence. The Bar simply 
cannot be permitted to paint with such a broad brush. This 
gratuitous Finding must be stricken. 
24. Finding No. 2(o): 
After Judge Frederick orally rendered his 
judgment in the Job malpractice action in 
favor of Mr. Jobf and before the formal 
judgment was entered on February 24, 1986, 
[Calder] transferred a substantial portion of 
his properties to his wife and brother. Such 
transfers are the subject of pending adver-
sary proceedings by [Calder1s] Chapter 7 
trustee to set aside such transfers as 
fraudulent transfers under the Bankruptcy 
Code. 
Wholly aside from the glaring absence in the record of any 
evidence remotely hinting at the value of the assets allegedly 
transferred to his wife and brother, this finding isf by defini-
tion, preliminary and tentative in that it acknowledges that the 
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transfers are the subject of pending adversary proceedings. The 
fact that Calderfs trustee has failed to obtain a resolution of 
the cases in the three years now available to him speaks loud and 
clear about the merits of his case and his ability to have the 
transfers declared fraudulent. Unless and until the litigation 
is resolved, the Panel should be precluded from using the mere 
pendency of the suits as even a partial basis for Calderfs 
disbarment. 
25. Finding No. 3: 
[Calder] filed a second Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
proceeding in 1986 in bad faith and it was 
dismissed by the ruling of Judge Allen made 
on May 12, 1986, which ruling is now final 
and non-appealable. [Calder] did not file 
his 1986 Chapter 13 case until March 12, 1986 
after entry of the judgment in favor of Job 
in the civil case and after [Calder] failed 
to post a supersedes bond to stay enforcement 
of the judgment during the pendency of his 
appeal. [Calder1s] interest in filing the 
Chapter 13 also was to frustrate the claims 
of Job and Bailey. 
This Finding is clearly erroneous for several reasons. First, 
the Finding purports to rely upon Judge Allen1s bench ruling 
dated May 12f 1986. While a copy of the ruling was introduced 
into evidence as Trial Ex. B-37, the Bar's prosecutor failed to 
adduce any copy of the underlying evidentiary hearing on which 
Judge Allen made his decision. This omission runs afoul of In Re 
Strong supra, 616 P.2d at 583. 
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Next, there is no evidence in the record that Calder!s 
intent in filing the Chapter 13 was " . . . to frustrate the 
claims of Job and Bailey." In purporting to determine that 
intent, the Panel ignored Calderfs explanation that his purpose 
for filing his 1984 petition was to save his house from an IRS 
sale and his purpose for filing the 1986 petition was to keep the 
assets of his law practice from being levied upon and dismembered 
by Job to the ultimate detriment of Calder and his other credi-
tors. (Tr. 653, 734, 740-41). 
Finally, the Finding fails to reflect that in November, 
1988, Calder posted a cash supersedeas bond in the amount of 
$55,000 to fully satisfy Job's judgment (Tr. 790, 793-94). It 
also fails to reflect that Bailey's state court claim was dis-
missed with prejudice, no cause of action (Tr. 7). 
26. Finding No. 4: 
When [Calder] filed his statement of affairs 
in his 1986 Chapter 7 case, he knowingly and 
intentionally filed a statement for a debtor 
"not engaged in business" when, in fact, 
[Calder] knew, at such time, that he was 
engaged in business. 
While Calder admitted at the Bar trial that he utilized a 
preprinted form statement for a debtor "not engaged in business" 
despite the fact that he was engaged in business, Calder !s 
trustee in bankruptcy acknowledged that he (the trustee) was not 
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prejudiced or confused in any way by Calderfs use of the techni-
cally incorrect form since the substance of required disclosure 
14 in both forms are substantially identical (Tr. 598). 
27. Finding No. 5: 
[Calder] also filed in 1986 a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy action wherein the assets listed 
are substantially less than those assets 
listed in either [Calder's] 1984 or 1986 
Chapter 13 schedules. [Calder] had not made 
any significant transfers of assets between 
the filing of his 1986 Chapter 13 and his 
1986 Chapter 7. 
This finding highlights the enormous prejudice imposed upon 
Calder by the Bar's failure to set forth even generally, let 
alone with particularity, the facts alleged to constitute fraudu-
lent misconduct. For the finding neglects to identify even one 
specific asset or any dollar amount for any asset deemed to have 
been fraudulently concealed. Moreover, even if Calder is forced 
into the untenable position of seeking to prove a negative i.e. 
that he did not conceal assets that the Bar has failed to iden-
tify, a careful review of his bankruptcy schedules belies the 
Bar's Finding. (Compare Trial Exs. B-30, B-31, B-32 and B-33). 
The Finding also ignores the fact that many of the so-called 
1 4
 Moreover, the bankruptcy statements of affairs (as distin-
guished from the bankruptcy schedules) are identical for debtors 
engaged in business and debtors not engaged in business. (Tr. 
373-74). 
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discrepancies were attributable to Calder's wife's interests 
being reflected in the 1984 filing and only his interest being 
reflected in the 1986 filing. (Tr. 394, 515). 
28. Finding No. 6; 
[Calder] was denied a general discharge in 
his Chapter 7 case by the Memorandum Decision 
of Judge Allen entered on or about September 
27, 1988f wherein the court found, by clear 
and convincing evidence, that [Calder's] 
failure to list assets in his Chapter 7 
bankruptcy was 'knowing and fraudulent'. 
Just like the other Findings rubber stamping another court's 
rulings on the basis of mere introduction of the written ruling, 
this Finding is devoid of any of the evidentiary predicates 
underlying the ruling. For this reason, it ignores the lesson of 
In Re Strong supra, 616 P.2d at 583 and must be vacated. 
In addition, as noted in Argument I above, the Bar's 
Complaints made no mention of the Bar's intent to impose sanc-
tions against Calder for the bankruptcy court's denial of a 
general discharge his own Chapter 7 case. Despite Calder's 
objection to the Panel's consideration of that issue, Tr. 179-83, 
the Panel made a specific finding that " . . . Calder's failure 
to list certain assets in his Chapter 7 bankruptcy was done 
'knowingly and fraudulently'." The Panel's decision to admit 
evidence of Calder's denial of discharge on the issue of his 
"state of mind," see Tr. 182, cannot now be relied upon as a 
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substantive basis to support the Panel's recommendation of 
disbarment. Nor can this finding be relied upon so long as 
Calder's appeal of the decision is progressing through the 
15 Federal system. 
29. Finding No. 7: 
By an order entered on or about November 18, 
1988, [Calder] was denied the right to 
convert his Chapter 7 case to a Chapter 13 
case ' in order to prevent [an] abuse of the 
bankruptcy process.' 
The Bar's intent to make Calder's 1988 conduct a part of the 
disiplinary proceedings was never disclosed in either of the 
Complaints. (See Argument I above). As such, this Finding must 
be vacated in its entirety. 
30. Finding No. 8: 
Considering the time frame of [Calder's] 
several bankruptcies and the great disparity 
in assets between filings and considering the 
fact that [Calder1s] primary creditor in 1986 
was Dennis Job with his malpractice judgment 
of approximately $55,000 plus interest, 
[Calder] was engaged in either actual fraud 
or an attempt to defraud creditors. 
In response to Calderfs objections to this Finding, the Bar 
stated that the Finding was an "inference" drawn from Findings 
1 5
 Moreover, the Bar's apparent obsession with attacking Calder 
for his conduct in his personal bankruptcies violates S 525(a) of 
the Bankruptcy Code which prohibits governmental units from 
revoking a debtor's license solely because the debtor sought 
bankruptcy relief. 11 U.S.C. § 525(a). 
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No. 3, 5, 6 and 7. Therefore, if the Court modifies any of those 
Findings, Finding No. 8 must be correspondingly vacated or 
modified. 
31. Finding No. 10: 
[Calder] stipulated to a private reprimand in 
1983 in a matter involving approximately 20 
different client matters. 
In response to Calderfs objection to this Finding, the Bar's 
Counsel stated that Exhibit B-52 supported it. However, even a 
cursory review of that exhibit discloses that it stands for no 
such thing. In addition, the only other piece of evidence 
tending to support the Finding is Exhibit B-40 which is simply a 
copy of the complaint on which the stipulation reflected in 
Exhibit B-52 was based. Significantly, Calder objected to the 
admission of Exhibit B-40 on several grounds: 
(i) As mere unsubstantiated allegations, the 
complaint could not be received as evidence of the truth of the 
allegations; 
(ii) The attempted admission of the complaint was 
foundationally deficient; 
(iii) The twenty prior complaints were beyond the 
scope of issues framed by the Complaints at issue in this pro-
ceeding. (R. 1066-70). 
-74-
Like every other objection Calder made in the proceed-
ing, the Panel overruled it and allowed the introduction of the 
complaint. In doing so, it relieved the Bar's prosecutor of the 
burden imposed on any other prosecutor to establish the underly-
ing merits, if any, of the allegations of the complaint, instead 
of relying upon a mere copy of the resulting stipulation. 
C. Summary. 
The foregoing analysis of the Panel's Findings estab-
lishes that they are hopelessly, clearly erroneous. To revert to 
the vernacular, the Findings are in a very real sense akin to 
cold fusion; they presume to create legal consequences far in 
excess of the evidence that went into them. Appellate correction 
of the process is required to insure that the litigant, Calder, 
is not professionally killed. 
ARGUMENT V 
THE PANEL IMPROPERLY FAILED TO CONSIDER OR 
FIND ANY MITIGATING FACTORS DURING THE 
PENALTY PHASE OF THE PROCEEDING. 
In its recommendation of discipline, the Panel found 
absolutely no mitigating factors. In reaching that determina-
tion, the Panel purported to consider each of the factors out-
lined in S 9.2 of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanc-
tions. (Recommendation at 20.) However, that section relates 
solely to aggravating circumstances to be considered in deciding 
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what sanction to impose. It is § 9.32 of the ABA Standards that 
sets forth mitigating factors. Notably, the Board's recommenda-
tion is devoid of any indication that it even considered any of 
those mitigating factors. If it had, it could consider S 9.32(d) 
which provides that a "timely good faith effort to make restitu-
tion or to rectify consequences of misconduct" is a mitigating 
factor relevant to fashioning a fair sanction. 
In this case, the Panel should have, but failed, to 
consider the following evidence on this issue: 
a) The extraordinary and unsolicited offer by Calder 
to the Bar in 1983 to attempt to resolve Bailey's first claim 
despite the Board's conclusion that the claim was time barred; 
b) Calderfs posting of a cash supersedeas bond in the 
amount of $55,000 to ensure the satisfaction of Job's judgment in 
the event it is affirmed on appeal; and 
c) The tenuous nature of the Findings. 
The Panel's inexplicable failure to properly apply (or, 
perhaps, even to consider) the standards which it deemed to 
control its determination, requires those determinations to be 
vacated. 
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ARGUMENT VI 
THE PANEL'S RECOMMENDATION OF DISBARMENT IS 
SO DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE CONDUCT THAT IT 
FOUND CONSTITUTED ETHICAL VIOLATIONS AS TO BE 
ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND UNREASONABLE. 
Given the almost incredible extent to which (i) the 
Findings are unsupported by the evidence, (ii) the Recommendation 
exceeds the scope of the Findings, and (iii) neither the Findings 
nor the Recommendation conform to the Bar's Complaints, the 
Recommendation must be rejected on the grounds that it is arbi-
trary, capricious and unreasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
For the forgoing reasons, the court should vacate or 
modify the Findings and Conclusions and should reject the 
Recommendat ion. 
DATED this jT_ day of August, 1989. 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
<AA*^&C* 
Jon^ i T. Anderson 
Attorney for Appellant 
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I hereby certify that on the /C day of August, 1989, 
four true and correct copies of the foregoing instrument were 
sent, postage prepaid in the United States mail, to the 
following: 
Christine Burdick, Bar Counsel 
Utah State Bar 
645 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
382:070389D 
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A P P E N D I X 1 
BEFORE THE DISCIPLINARY HEARING PANEL 
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
Hearing Panel: 
Robert J. Stansfield, Chairman 
Richard P. Makoff 
Molly P. Sumner 
In Re: 
RICHARD J. CALDER 
DOB: 6-14-30 
Admitted: 11-5-59 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
1 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
• RECOMMENDATION OF 
i DISCIPLINE 
i F-253 and F-274 
i (Consolidated) 
This matter, having been previously consolidated by 
Order dated October 4, 1988, came on for disciplinary trial 
on November 14-15, 1988, December 2, 3 and 20, 1988, and 
January 23, 1989, before a Disciplinary Hearing Panel of 
the Utah State Bar comprised of Robert J. Stansfield, 
Chair, Richard P. Makoff, and Molly Sumner* Special Bar 
Counsel, David E. Leta, Esq., appeared on behalf of the 
Utah State Bar and Richard J. Calder appeared in person and 
through counsel, Daniel R. Boone, Esq. The Panel having 
taken testimony and having admitted Exhibits R-l and 
B1-B52, as shown by the record, and having heard argument 
of counsel and being otherwise fully advised in the 
premises, makes its Findings, Conclusions, and 
Recommendation as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT - 1 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Panel makes the following findings, based upon 
clear and convincing evidence in the record, with respect 
to F-274f involving Larry Bailey. 
a. Mr. Bailey originally retained Respondent to 
file a bankruptcy in 1978. Problems arose in this 
bankruptcy respecting the discharge of a certain 
judgment debt which precluded Mr. Bailey from 
obtaining a Utah driver's license. 
b. In or about October 1983, Respondent entered 
into an engagement with Mr. Bailey# arranged through 
Bar Counsel, C. Jeffrey Paoletti, to resolve an 
investigation of a disciplinary complaint filed by Mr. 
Bailey against Respondent. By this engagement, 
Respondent agreed that he would obtain an amendment to 
Mr. Bailey's bankruptcy schedules and obtain a 
discharge for Mr. Bailey of a judgment debt owed by 
Mr. Bailey to Richard D. and Morren C. Harris in the 
sum of about $1,400.00. 
c. Respondent agreed to complete the engagement 
and achieve the objective upon Mr. Bailey's paying 
$10.00 for additional attorney's fees; Mr. Bailey made 
said payment of $10.00 to Respondent. 
d. After accepting the engagement and agreeing 
upon the fee to be charged, Respondent demanded 
additional money from Mr. Bailey, in the amount of 
FTXjn-NGS OF FACT - 2 
$120.00, in order to initiate the engagement. Mr. 
Bailey complained to Mr. Paelotti about this 
additional fee. 
e. Subsequent to the October 1983 engagement, 
numerous communications were exchanged between Mr. 
Bailey and Respondent, and between Respondent and Bar 
Counsel which concluded with Respondent reaffirming 
his agreement to continue representing Mr. Bailey in 
amending the bankruptcy schedules. Mr. Bailey paid an 
additional $15.00 to Respondent, at Respondent's 
request, in furtherance of the engagement. 
f. After reaffirming the engagement, Respondent 
filed documents with the Bankruptcy Court on behalf of 
Mr. Bailey as Mr. Bailey's counsel. 
g. Though Respondent presented conflicting 
evidence as to the agreement, the Panel accepted 
former Bar Counsel C. Jeffrey Paelotti's testimony as 
the most credible evidence of Respondent's agreement 
to represent Mr. Bailey in amending his Bankruptcy. 
h. Respondent filed a Motion to Reopen Mr. 
Bailey's case, but the Motion was inadequate on its 
face. 
i. After filing the Motion with the Bankruptcy 
Court, Respondent failed to follow through with his 
representation of Mr. Bailey by failing to schedule 
the Motion to Reopen for hearing and by failing to 
present the Motion to the judge for consideration. 
j. The Motion to Reopen was denied, and, 
immediately upon learning of the Court's order, 
Respondent withdrew from representing Mr. Bailey. At 
no time after February 16, 1984, did Respondent make 
any effort to obtain substitute counsel for Bailey, 
return the $10.00 paid by Bailey, refund any portion 
of the original attorney's fees and costs paid by 
Bailey for the Chapter 7, take any steps with the 
Department of Motor Vehicles to assist Bailey obtain a 
driver's license or, in any other way, assist Bailey 
in achieving the desired objective. 
k. On or about April 16, 1984, Respondent, being 
under oath, prepared, signed and filed an affidavit in 
the case of Bailey v. Calder, Civil No. C85-800, then 
pending in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, wherein Respondent 
knowingly and intentionally made the following 
misrepresentations and false statements: 
1) That after Judge Mabey had originally 
granted an application to reopen Mr. Bailey's 
case, the client was "to pay a $60.00 filing fee 
to the court and also a $10.00 fee to add the 
creditor that he had omitted, when, in fact, 
^•MnTvr.c nT 72P^ - 4 
there was no such financial arrangement at that 
time; 
2) That after 1979, Respondent had not had 
any contact with Bailey until 1982 when, in fact 
Bailey had contacted Respondent on several 
occasions prior to that date; 
3) That Respondent did not represent Bailey 
as his attorney in 1982 inasmuch as Bailey had 
refused to pay anything to Respondent as 
requested, when, in fact, Respondent had written 
to Bailey in 1982 advising Bailey that Respondent 
was proceeding with his case; 
4) That he had agreed to help Mr. Bailey in 
1983 at the request of the Utah State Bar but 
that nothing more was done because Bailey refused 
to pay money when, in fact, Bailey had paid, in 
full, all the money requested pursuant to the 
agreement; 
5) That in 1983 he was not representing Mr. 
Bailey because Bailey had not paid his retainer 
fee and had "paid no money to [him]" when, in 
fact, Bailey had paid all fees required under the 
agreement; and 
6) That at no time after 1978 had 
Respondent represented Bailey in any bankruptcy 
matters, when, in fact, he had represented 
FINDINGS OF FACT - 5 
Bailey, had advised Bailey ahpnt- Kankrupt-ry 
matters, and had filed motions for Bailey as 
xflS19yLi Bailey's attorney both iy 1979/and in 1984. 
1. In submitting the above-mentioned affidavit, 
Respondent knew that the affidavit was submitted under 
oath and that it would be relied upon by a judge in 
adjudicating a legal matter pending before the court. 
m. When Respondent filed a personal Chapter 13 
on February 23, 1984, he did not list Bailey as a 
creditor even though, at that time, Respondent knew 
that he was required to list all Icnown and contingent 
liabilities and also knew that Bailey probably had a 
claim against him for his failure to comply with the 
terms of his agreement to^achieve the desired 
objective. Respondent did not seek to amend his 1984 
Chapter 13 to add Bailey as a creditor until January 
31, 1986 even though, as early as February 1985 
Respondent knew that Bailey had filed a malpractice 
action against him in the Third Judicial District 
Court, Civil No. C85-800. 
n. Respondent did not attempt to give Mr. Bailey 
notice of his 1984 Chapter 13 bankruptcy at any time 
until after January 31, 1986. 
o. Respondent's 1984 Chapter 13 case was 
dismissed by Judge Allen's on July 31, 1986, as having 
been filed in bad faith. The court's order of 
FINDINGS OF FACT - 6 
dismissal is final and non-appealable. No credible 
evidence was presented to indicate that the dismissal 
of Respondent's 1984 Chapter 13 was for reasons other 
than that it was filed in bad faith or that the 
Bankruptcy Court had any reason to dismiss the case 
other than on the merits as set forth in Judge Allen's 
ruling of July 30, 1986. 
p. Mr. Bailey was unable to obtain employment 
for a substantial period of time due to his inability 
— — — — — — • •
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to obtain a driver's license. 
2. The Panel made the following findings, based on 
clear and convincing evidence in the record, with respect 
to F-253 involving Dennis Job. 
a. In or about October 1983, Dennis and Reta Job 
retained Respondent to file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy on 
their behalf. 
b. At the time Respondent agreed to file a 
Chapter 7 case for Mr. and Mrs. Job, Respondent knew 
that (1) Mr. Job was a plaintiff in a lawsuit,entitled 
Job, et al. v. Pocklington, et al. which^was then 
pending in the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah, Civil No. C82-1085C, (2) Mr. Job 
was seeking a substantial amount of money and damages, 
in excess of $1,000,000 in such suit, (3) the cause of 
action had to be listed as an asset in Job's Chapter 7 
case, and (4) Job wanted the asset listed in his 
FINDINGS OF FACT - 7 
Chapter 7 case. Nothwithstanding this knowledge, 
Respondent did not take reasonable steps and 
precautions to insure_jfchat this cause of action was 
properly scheduled and listed in Job's Chapter 7 case. 
c. At the time Respondent recommended that Job 
file a Chapter 7, he did not discuss with Job the 
option of filing under Chapter 13, and did not mention 
any additional advantages which Job might realize if 
he elected to proceed under Chapter 13. 
d. Subsequently, on or about April 27, 1984, 
Respondent, rather than seeking to amend the Chapter 7 
schedules, filed a Chapter 13 proceeding, for which 
Mr. Job paid Respondent an additional $150.00, even 
though, in giving this advice, Respondent knew, or 
should have known, that: 
1 ^ -TReChapter 13 was likely to be 
dismissed as a "bad faith filing" in light o\ 
Job's previous discharge under Chapter 7 
2) Job could not "save his home" under the^  
Chapter 13 unless he had regular income with 
fhich-to make 
" ^ — 
3) The Chapter 13 would be ineffective 
unless the previous discharge in the Chapter 7 
were revoked or vacated; and 
r» —\T^TXT/*C r\r> v\r»~i - Q 
4) Job would not obtain a discharge under 
his Chapter 13 case until he had successfully 
completed all payments under the plan. 
e. Respondent withdrew from representing Mr.^ ,Tnh 
in July 1984, without Mr. Job's consent and knowledge. 
At the time of his withdrawal Respondent knew that it 
would be difficult for Mr. Job to obtain substitute 
counsel to resist the^Chapter 13 trustee's pending 
Motion for Dismissal. 
f. Respondent made no effort to assist Mr. Job 
in obtaining substitute counsel to represent him in 
the Chapter 13 proceeding. 
g. On or about August 8, 1984f the Chapter 13 
was dismissed and the Chapter 7 vacatedf with the 
result that Mr. Job did not obtain any relief under 
either bankruptcy chapter. 
h. Thereafter, unable to afford new bankruptcy 
counsel, Mr. Job filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, pro 
sef in an attempt to prevent foreclosure proceedings 
on the Jobs' home; the Chapter 11 filing was late and 
— 
the home was lost. 
i. On or about September 11, 1984, Dennis and 
Reta Job filed a malpractice action against Respondent 
in the Third Judicial District Court, Civil No. 
C84-5436. 
NGS OF FACT - 9 
At no time after July 1984, did Respondent 
seek to amend his 1984 personal Chapter 13 case to 
list Job as a creditor even though he knew that Job 
had claims against him for malpractice and had filed a 
lawsuit on September 11, 1984 in the Third Judicial 
District Court, Civil NO. C84-5436, asserting such 
claims. 
k. On or about July 16, 1985, at a time Mr. Job 
was moving for Summary Judgment in the pending 
malpractice action, Respondent filed a Motion to 
Reopen Job's Chapter 11 proceeding ./solel^ with the 
intent to harass, injure and annoy Mr. Job; no valid 
basis existed for filing the motion and the mo.tion 
asserted matters upon which Respondent had no basis to 
make such allegations; in that respect, Respondenr 
knowingly and intentionally made the following false 
or misleading statements: 
(1) That he was a creditor of Job when, in 
fact, he had never submitted a bill, 
previously demanded payment, or 
counterclaimed in the civil action for the 
payment of any attorney's fees; 
(2) That the Jobs had intentionally omitted 
creditors from their Chapter 11 case when, 
in fact, Respondent-knew that the claims of 
rTxmrvcc rr VZCT - I D 
such creditors were contingent and disputed 
by the debtors; 
(3) That the Jobs had omitted a debt to a 
family member in the amount of $35,000 when, 
in fact, Respondent had no reasonable basis 
for asserting such omission; 
(4) That the debtor's Chapter 7 schedules 
filed in 1983 had shown a gross income in 
1982 of $30,000 when, in fact, the income 
had been earned in 1981; and 
(5) That the Jobs had omitted a substantial 
claim to the Internal Revenue Service in the 
amount of $5,000-$10,000 when, in fact, 
Respondent had no reasonable basis for 
making this assertion. 
1. At no time at or prior to filing his motion 
to reopen, did Respondent file, or attempt to file, a 
proof of claim in Job's Chapter 11 case. 
m. In connection with the civil action entitled 
Job v. Calder, Civil No. C84-5436, filed in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, Respondent filed an Affidavit on or about July 
18, 1985 wherein Respondent knowingly and 
intentionally made the following misstatements and 
accusations: 
FINDINGS OF FACT - 11 
1) That Job was responsible for failing to 
list the lawsuit in his schedules when, in fact. 
Respondent admits that when Job signed the 
schedules, the lawsuit was listed as an asset; 
2) That there was "some reason to think 
that the debtor may have stolen a key from the 
attorney's desk drawer while he was alone in the 
office and entered the office at night and 
effected certain changes [sic] original document 
that was to be filed with the Court" when, in 
fact, Respondent had no facts upon which to base 
< 
this accusation. Respondent also stated: 
"Another theory is Mr* Job had access to 
defendant's office and perpetrated a fraud upon 
everybody by substituting a false paper in the 
papers to be filed with the Court"; and 
3) That, by insinuation and implication, 
Job had tampered with the official files 
maintained by the Bankruptcy Court when, in fact, 
Respondent had no basis in fact to make any such 
insinuation or accusation. 
n. The Panel finds those defenses, accusation, 
and insinuations made by Respondent against Job to be 
spurious and indicative of an attitude of^bad_faith 
which pervades Respondent's conduct in connection with 
FINDINGS OF FACT - 12 
the Utah State Bar disciplinary proceedings(^ ncL/-£he 
court proceedings. 
o. After Judge Frederick orally rendered his 
judgment in the Job malpractice action in favor of Mr. 
Job, and before the formal judgment was entered on 
February 24, 1986, Respondent transferred a 
substantial portion of his property to his wife and 
brother. Such transfers are the subject of pending 
adversary proceedings by Respondent's Chapter 7 
trustee to set aside such transfers as fraudulent 
transfers under the Bankruptcy Code. 
3. Respondent filed a second Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
proceeding in 1986 in bad faith and it was dismissed by the 
ruling of Judge Allen made on May 12, 1986, which ruling is 
now final and non-appealable. Respondent did not file his 
1986 Chapter 13 case until March 12, 1986 after entry of 
the judgment in favor of Job in the civil case and after 
Respondent failed to post a supersedeas bond to stay 
enforcement of the judgment during the pendency of his 
appeal. Respondent's interest in filing the Chapter 13 
also was^ jto frustrate the^claims of Job and Bailey. 
4. When Respondent filed his statement of affairs in 
his 1986 Chapter 7 case, he knowingly and intentionally 
filed a statement for a debtor "not engaged in business" 
when, in fact, Respondent knew, at such time, that he was 
engaged in business. 
r'TiTnrtT^r « n r^ /^*>f-r 
5.^ -RefependeifE" also filed in 1986 a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy action wherein the assets listed are 
substantially less than those assets listed in either 
Respondent's 1984 or 1986 Chapter 13 schedules./ Respondent 
had not made any significant transfers of assets between 
the filing of his 1986 Chapter 13 and his 1986 Chapter 7. 
6. Respondent was denied a general discharge in his 
Chapter 7 case by the Memorandum Decision of Judge Allen 
entered on or about September 27r 1988, wherein the court 
found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent's 
failure to list certain assets in his Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
was "knowing and fraudulent." 
7. By an order entered on or about November 18, 1988, 
Respondent was denied the right to convert his Chapter 7 
case to a Chapter 13 case "in order to prevent [an] abuse 
of the bankruptcy process." 
8. Considering the time frame of Respondent's several 
bankruptcies and the great disparity ^n assets between 
filings and considering the fact that Respondent's primary 
creditor in 1986 was Dennis Job with his malpractice 
judgment of approximately $55,000 + interest, Respondent 
was engaged either in actual fraud or^aa^attempt to defraud 
creditors. 
9. Though Respondent testified and presented defenses 
to the charges of ethical violations, the Panel does not 
find that testimony credible; Respondent had an excellent 
nr\TnT\Tr^ ^r* T?*\r*ni _ 1 * 
memory of details which served his purpose and failed to 
remember any detail which might be construed against him; 
further, when the production of certaiiy files )would have 
been helpful to his defenses if they contained what he 
represented, such files conveniently appeared to be lost or 
unavailable, 
c > 
10• Respondent stipulated to a private reprimand in 
1983 in a matter involving apjproximately 20 different 
client matters. 
11. Mr. Job and Mr. Bailey retained Respondent 
relying upon his substantial experience as a bankruptcy 
attorney and relied on his advice in signing and submitting 
documents in connection with their bankruptcy proceedings 
and relied on Respondent to forthrightly and timely correct 
any problem with their bankruptcies that may have arisen. 
12. At the outset, in handling the errors made in the 
Bailey and Job bankruptcies, the corrections could have 
been handled without a great expenditure of time or 
resources on the part of Respondent; Respondent failed to 
follow through on the steps he himself ultimately initiated 
in assisting Mr. Job and Mr* Bailey. 
Based on the foregoing Findings, the Panel makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. With respect to F-274, involving Larry Bailey, the 
Panel concludes as follows: 
FTMnrMr:^  or FAPT - i z 
a. Respondent had an attorney-client 
relationship with Larry Bailey at various times from 
1978 through at least 1983; Respondent's 
representations in his affidavit filed in the Bailey 
malpractice lawsuit as outlines in Finding K 1) 
through 6) constitutes misrepresentations in violation 
of Canon 1, DR1-102(A)(4) of the Revised Rules of 
Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar. 
b7""~~~~"Respend* us personal 
bankruptcy in 1984 and 1986 in an attempt to defeat 
the claims of Mr. Bailey by filing false affidavits 
constitutes dishonesty and fraud in violation of Canon 
1, DR1-102(A)(4) of the Revised Rules of Professional 
Conduct of jLhe. Utah^State Bar. 
c. Respondent's filing of significantly disparate 
schedules of assets in his personal Chapter 13 
bankruptcy in 1986 and the 1986 Chapter 7 in such a 
short time span constitutes dishonesty and fraud in 
violation of Canon 1, DR1-102(A)(4) of the Revised 
Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar. 
d. Respondent's bad faith filing ofhi&~personal 
bankruptcies inr 1984jand 1986, was for the primary 
purpose of harassing and avoiding the claims of Mr* 
Bailey, and constitutes conduct adversely reflecting 
on his fitness to practice law in violation of Canon 
rTxmTwr!c OTT T7Arrr - 1 6 
1, DR1-102(A) (6) of the Revised Rules of Professional 
Conduct of the Utah State Bar. 
e. Respondent's initial failure to file a Motion 
to Amend on behalf of Mr. Bailey as agree<Ljipoa__ 
between former Bar Counsel, Respondent an<a Mr. BaileV) 
constitutes neglect of a legal matter in violation of 
Canon 6, DR6-10KA) (3) of the Revised Rules of 
Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar. 
f. Respondent's failure to follow through with 
the Motion to Amend once it was filed was knowing and 
resulted in dismissal of the Motion and constitutes an 
intentional failure to carry out a contract of 
employment for professional services in violation of 
Canon 7, DR7-10KA) (2) of the Revised Rules of 
Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar. 
g. Respondent's failure to notify Mr. Bailey of 
the dismissal of his Motion to Amend combined with 
Respondent's subsequent withdrawal of counsel without 
notice^to Mr. Bailey resulted in harm to Mr. Bailey's 
ability to have the Harris debt discharged and ability 
to obtain a Utah driver's license and constitutes an 
intentional prejudicing of a client's interests during 
the course of a professional relationship in violation 
of Canon 7, DR 7-101(A)(3) of the Revised Rules of 
Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar. 
FINDINGS OF FACT - 17 
h. Respondent's submission of a knowingly false 
affidavit in the malpractice action styled Bailey v. 
Calder constitutes conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice in violation of Canon 1, 
DR1-102(A) (5) of the Revised Rules of Professional 
Conduct of the Utah State Bar. 
i. Respondent's failure to timely notify Mr. 
Bailey of his personal bankruptcy when he knew Mr. 
Bailey was a potential creditor constitutes conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice in 
violation of Canon lf DR 1-102(A)(5) of the Revised 
Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar. 
2. With respect to F-253, involving Dennis Job, the 
Panel concludes as follows: 
.a. Respondent's failure to list Mr. Job's 
Federal Court cause of action as an asset in the Jobs' 
bankruptcy constitutes neglect of a legal matter in 
violation of Canon 6, DR 6-101(A)(3) of the Revised 
Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar. 
J&:""Respondent's filing of his personal 
bankruptcies ill IjJfulnd 1986 was for the priimary 
/purpose to harass or maliciously injure Mr. Job in 
3^bigtit_of the ma1pra£ti£^action styled Job^y. Calder 
and constitutes taking an action in representing 
himself which Respondent knew would serve merely to 
harass or maliciously injure another in violation of 
Canon 7, DR 7-102(A)(l) of the Revised Rules of 
Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar, 
c. Respondent's filing a Chapter 13 on behalf of 
Mr. Job and then failing to respond to the Chapter 13 
trustee's Motion for Dismissal, resulting in a 
dismissal with prejudice of Mr. Job's Chapter 13 
proceeding constitutes intentional prejudice and 
damage to the client during the course of the 
professional relationship in violation of Canon 7, DR 
7-101(A)(3) of the Revised Rules of Professional 
Conduct of the Utah State Bar. 
d. Respondent's withdrawal from representing Mr. 
Job without notice to Mr. Job while the Chapter 13 
* . . ^ • 
trustee's Motion to Dismiss was pending constitutes 
intentional prejudice to a client during the course of 
a professional relationship in violation of Canon 7, 
DR 7-101(A)(3) of the Revised Rules of Professional 
Conduct of the Utah State Bar. 
e. Respondent's filing of his affidavit 
containing false and spurious representations in the 
malpractice action styled Job v. Calder constitutes 
dishonesty, misrepresentation and conduct prejudicial 
to the administration of justice in violation of Canon 
1, DR 1-102(A)(4) and Canon 1, DR1-102(A)(5) of the 
Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah 
State Bar. 
f. Respondent's filing the Motion to Reopen upon 
a large number of Mr. Job's creditors in Job's Chapter 
11 was without foundation or basis and constitutes 
taking action merely intended to harass another and 
conduct adversely reflecting on his fitness to 
practice law in violation of Canon 7, DR 7-102(A)(1) 
and Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(6) of the Revised Rules of 
Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar. 
Based on the foregoing Findings and Conclusions, the 
Panel makes the following: 
RECOMMENDATION OF DISCIPLINE 
The Panel relied on the guidelines of the ABA in 
determining a sanction, considering each of the factors 
outlined in Section 9.2 of the ABA Standards for Imposing 
** <. " "L"n - -
Lawyer Sanctions, particularly noting that aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances may relate to the offenses at 
issue, matters independent of the specific offense but 
relevant to fitness to practice, or matters arising 
incident to the disciplinary proceeding. 
MITIGATION; 
AGGRAVATION; 
1. Respondent has a prior disciplinary history 
involving a stipulated private reprimand in 1983 entered 
into to resolve approximately 20 separate client matters; 
the Panel took into consideration the time period in which 
the prior discipline was imposed. 
2. Respondent displayed a dishonest and selfish 
motive in his attempts to cover his inappropriate handling 
of both the Job and Bailey bankruptcies by filing several 
personal bankruptcies in bad faith, filing false affidavits 
in the malpractice actions filed by both Mr. Bailey and Mr. 
Job, and by filing inappropriate asset schedules, and in 
doing so perpetrated fraud, engaged in misrepresentations 
and in misleading conduct with the courts and his clients. 
3. Respondent's actions display a(gattern of 
misconduct that have exceeded a decade beginning with the 
representation of Mr. Bailey in 1978 and the subsequent 
representation of Mr. Job in 1983 and Mr. Bailey since 
1983. 
4. Respondent has committed multiple disciplinary 
offenses with respect to both Mr. Job and Mr. Bailey as 
outlined in the Conclusions of Law and which taken together 
constitute egregious misconduct. 
5. Respondent has failed to recognize that he has 
engaged in any misconduct and displays a totalJLack of 
remorse and has contradicted on many occasions his own 
testimony in order to avoid any responsibility; that 
attitude continued even after this Panel announced its 
findings with respect to the disciplinary rules violated. 
6. The clients in this case were particularly 
vulnerable since the assistance they sought was in a highly 
specialized area of law in which Respondent purported to be 
TTTXTT^TXT/' 
one of the foremost experts, at least by implication in 
that he claims to file more bankruptcy cases than any 
practitioner in the State. 
7. Respondent has substantial experience in the 
practice of law, having filed thousands upon thousands of 
matters in Bankruptcy Court and could have easily, and 
without great expense, addressed his clients1 problems at 
the outset but intentionally refused and failed to do so. 
8. Respondent has shown an indifference to making 
restitution from the beginning when he could have handled 
the clients' problems with relatively little consumption of 
time and expense; he failed and refused to timely and 
professionally act on those problems even when the concerns 
were specifically addressed by the Bar and the clients. 
Relying on the above factors, and the egregious nature 
of the totality of the misconduct
 f the Disciplinary Hearing 
Panel hereby recommends that the Respondent be disbarred 
from the practice of law in the State of Utah endythat 
prior to any reinstatement the Respondent show that he has 
satisfied the malpractice judgment obtained against him by 
Mr. Job and that Respondent pay the costs incurred by the 
Utah State Bar in prosecuting this action; said costs shall 
be established by affidavit to be submitted by the Office 
of Bar Counsel. 
Dated this ICw daq of February, 1989. 
THE DISCIPLINARY HEARING PANEL 
A 
ield, Chair 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact was hand delivered to Daniel R, 
Boone, Esq-, 8 East 300 South, #735, Salt Lake City, Utah 
day of A 84111 this 1989. 
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A P P E N D I X 2 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
In Re: 
RICHARD CALDER 
DOB: 11/04/32 
Admitted: 09/05/74 
FORMAL COMPLAINT 
No. F-274 
The attorney charged with unprofessional conduct in 
this complaint is Richard Calder, who is an Attorney and 
Counselor in the State of Utah, and a member of the Utah 
State Bar, residing at Salt Lake City, in the County of Salt 
Lake, State of Utah, and whose address, according to the 
records of the Executive Director of the Utah State Bar, is 
2480 South Main Street #109, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115. 
II 
This Complaint is filed with the Board of 
Commissioners of the Utah State Bar by the undersigned as 
the regularly appointed Ethics and Discipline Committee of 
the Utah State Bar. 
Ill 
The ethical violations and the factual basis in support 
thereof are alleged as follows: 
Ethical Allegations 
1. That Richard Calder has violated Canon 1, DR 
1-102(A)(4) of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of 
the Utah State Bar by engaging in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; 
2* That Richard Calder has violated Canon 1, DR 
1-102(A)(5) of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of 
the Utah State Bar by engaging in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice; and/or 
3. That Richard Calder has violated Canon 1, DR 
1-102(A)(6) of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of 
the Utah State Bar by engaging in any other conduct that 
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law; and 
4. That Richard Calder has violated Canon 6, DR 
6-101(A)(2) of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of 
the Utah State Bar by handling a legal matter with 
preparation adequate in the circumstances; or 
5. Canon 6, DR 6-101(A)(3) of the Revised Rules of 
Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar by neglecting a 
legal matter entrusted to him; 
6. That Richard Calder has violated Canon 7, DR 
7-10KAH2) of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of 
the Utah State Bar by intentionally failing to carry out a 
contract of employment for professional services; 
7. That Richard Calder has violated Canon 7, DR 
7-101(A)(3) of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of 
the Utah State Bar by intentionally prejudicing or damaging 
his client's interest during the course of the relationship. 
Factual Allegations 
1. In October 1983 a complaint by Larry Bailey against 
Respondent was dismissed as the statute of limitations 
barred any action. 
2. Respondent indicated to the Screening Panel and Bar 
Counsel Jeff Paoletti during the proceedings on that matter 
that he would amend the bankruptcy schedules of Mr. Bailey 
to include the names of creditors Richard D. and Morena C. 
Harris in an amount of $1,399.00 and finally resolve the 
bankruptcy that Respondent had filed on behalf of Mr. Bailey 
in 1978. The only requirement was that Mr. Bailey pay 
Respondent $10.00. 
3. Mr. Bailey paid $10.00 to Respondent in November 
1983. 
4. In December 1983 Respondent notified Mr. Bailey by 
letter that the Bankruptcy Court would require that his case 
be reopened before the omitted debt could be added. 
Respondent stated that there would be a $50.00 filing fee 
and a $70.00 attorney fee. 
5. Mr. Bailey contacted Mr. Paoletti by telephone and 
complained that Respondent was not keeping the agreement he 
had made with the Bar. 
6. Respondent agreed to complete the work for only 
$15.00 more. 
7. On December 29, 1983, Mr. Bailey paid the $15.00. 
8. In January 1984 Respondent filed a "Motion to 
Reopen Chapter 7 to Add A-3 Claims". 
9. The court denied the motion without prejudice to 
its renewal, because of the lack of specificity in the 
motion, which did not name the specific creditors to be 
added or give a basis for reopening the case. 
10. Immediately thereafter Respondent notified Mr. 
Bailey by letter that he was returning $15.00 to him and 
that he would not handle the case further. 
11. In an affidavit submitted by Respondent in Bailey 
v. Calder, Civil No. C85-800, in The Third District Court, 
dated April 16, 1985, Respondent falsely stated: "At no time 
since 1978 have I represented Ernest L. Bailey in any 
bankruptcy matters." 
WHEREFORE, the undersigned, on behalf of the UTAH STATE 
BAR prays that proceedings be taken herein against the 
attorney charged pursuant to the Procedures of Discipline of 
the Utah State Bar and that the Utah State Bar be awarded 
its costs in bringing this action. 
DATED this ,Q^ day of /9<JK , 1987. 
Jd^Carol Nesset-Sale Franklin L. Gunnell 
Bar Counsel Chairman, Ethics and 
Discipline Committee 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Formal Complaint and Summons was mailed certified 
mail return receipt requested to Richard Calder, Attorney 
at Law, 2480 South Main Street #109, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84115 and to Daniel Boone, Attorney for Respondent, 8 East 
300 SouthJT£35, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this ^(2/day 
of 
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(Q/MtU^ 1987. 
A P P E N D I X 3 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
OF THE UTAH STATE BAR 
IN RE: 
J. RICHARD CALDER 
1 AMENDED FORMAL 
i COMPLAINT 
I No. F-253 
I 
The attorney charged with unprofessional conduct in 
this complaint is J. Richard Calder, who is an Attorney and 
Counselor in the State of Utah, and a member of the Utah 
State Bar, residing at Salt Lake City, in the County of Salt 
Lake, in the State of Utah, and whose address, according to 
the records of the Executive Director of the Utah State 
Bar, is 2480 South Main Street, #109, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84115. 
II 
This complaint is filed with the Board of 
Commissioners of the Utah State Bar by the undersigned as 
the regularly appointed Ethics and Discipline Committee of 
the Utah State Bar. 
Ill 
The unprofessional conduct charged in violation of the 
Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar 
is alleged to be as follows, based upon allegations of fact 
set forth below: 
« % 
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1. That J. Richard Calder has violated Canon 1, DR 
1-102(A)(4): engaging in conduct involving in dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; 
2. That J. Richard Calder has violated DR 1-102(A)(6): 
engaging in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his 
fitness to practice law; 
3. That J. Richard Calder has violated DR 1-102(A)(5): 
engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice; 
4. That J. Richard Calder has violated Canon 6, DR 
6-101(A)(2): handling a legal matter without preparation 
adequate in the circumstances; 
5c That J. Richard Calder has violated DR 6-101(A)(3): 
neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him; 
6. That J. Richard Calder has violated Canon 7, DR 
7-101(A)(l): a lawyer shall not intentionally fail to seek 
the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably 
available means...; 
7. That J- Richard Calder has violated DR 7-101(A)(3): 
a lawyer shall not intentionally prejudice or damage his 
client during the course of the professional relationship; 
8. That J. Richard Calder has violated Canon 7, DR 
7-102(A)(l): in his representation of a client, a lawyer 
shall not file a suit, assert a position... or take other 
action on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is 
obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or 
maliciously injure another; 
9, That J. Richard Calder has violated Canon 9,: 
avoiding the appearance of impropriety. 
ALLEGATIONS OF FACT; 
a. On January 9, 1986, Judge Frederick heard a case 
entitled Dennis R, Job and Reta Job v. Richard Calder, Civil 
No. C-84-5436 in the Third Judicial District Court. 
b. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in that 
case state that: 
1. In about October 1983 Plaintiffs retained 
Defendant as their counsel to advise them regarding the 
filing of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. 
2. Plaintiffs informed Defendant that Dennis Job 
owned stock and was plaintiff in a Federal District 
Court lawsuit, Job v. Pocklington, et. al., C82-1085C. 
3. Defendant made a note of that lawsuit in his 
working papers to be listed as an asset. 
4. Plaintiff signed schedules prepared by 
Defendant that included that lawsuit as an asset. 
5. Plaintiffs Chapter 7 bankruptcy was filed on 
October 13, 1983, No. 83C-02769. 
6. Defendant and/or his employee filed the 
schedules with the bankruptcy court but the schedules 
did not list the Federal District Court lawsuit or 
ownership of stock as asset. 
7. The bankruptcy court entered a order of 
discharge on January 9, 1984, noting "the above matter 
has been closed as a *no asset1 case. The Defendants 
in the Federal District Court lawsuit learned that 
Plaintiffs had filed the Chapter 7 bankruptcy and upon 
checking the court files that the lawsuit and ownership 
of stock were not listed as assets. 
8. On about April 13, 1984, Defendants moved to 
reopen the Chapter 7 bankruptcy inferentially alleging 
bankruptcy, fraud and perjury for failure to list the 
assets. 
9. Plaintiffs finally contacted Defendant, told 
him they were upset over his failure to list the 
assets and the allegations of fraud and perjury 
brought against them and asked him to oppose the motion 
to reopen, to which the Defendant responded he would 
take care of it. 
10. Defendant failed to take appropriate 
corrective action when it became known the omission 
occurred. 
11. Defendant determined, rather than seeking to 
amend the Chapter 7 schedules, to file a Chapter 13 
proceeding, for which Plaintiffs paid him an additional 
$150.00. The Chapter 13 proceeding was filed April 27, 
1984. 
12. Defendants1 expert witness, Judith Boulden, 
the standing trustee for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, 
testified this procedure was an improper use of the 
bankruptcy law. 
13. Defendant omitted Plaintiffs' stock ownership 
as an asset in the Chapter 13. Defendant also failed 
to oppose the motion to reopen or express to the 
bankruptcy court or Judith Boulden that the assets were 
revealed to him by the Plaintiffs or that the omission 
was his mistake. Defendant admitted that he did not 
think it was his duty to the Plaintiffs to acknowledge 
his mistake. 
14. Defendant alleged in his Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
that Plaintiffs' had stolen a key to his office and 
tampered with the schedules, or substituted schedules 
in the bankruptcy courts file. 
15. On May 15r 1984, Defendant stated during the 
hearing on the Motion to reopen, "Well, we don't oppose 
reopening the case" and the Motion was granted. 
16. On June 12, 1984, a Motion to continue the 
Federal District Court lawsuit which had been filed 
earlier was granted. The grounds for that Motion were 
that the lawsuit, upon reopening the Chapter 7, would 
be in the control of the Chapter 7 trustee. 
Subsequently, Plaintiffs attorney, Dennis Olsen, moved 
to withdraw from that case on the grounds that the 
lawsuit was not in control of the Chapter 7 trustee, 
which motion was granted. Plaintiffs expended 
$3,600.00 in costs and fees in preparing their Federal 
District Court lawsuit for trial. 
17. On June 26, 1984, the standing trustee for the 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy moved to dismiss Plaintiffs1 
Chapter 13 with prejudice, or in the alternative, to 
reconvert to a Chapter 7. Defendant told Plaintiffs 
that he would handle the trustee's Motion. On July 3, 
1984, Defendant moved to withdraw as counsel for 
Plaintiffs. On August 6, 1984, over Plaintiffs1 
objection, the Motion to withdraw was granted, just two 
days prior to the hearing on the trustee's Motion. 
18. On August 8, 1984, a hearing was held on the 
trustee's Motion, and the court ordered the discharge 
previously granted under the Chapter 7 would be revoked 
and the Chapter 13 would be dismissed without 
prejudice. 
19. Plaintiffs were unable to afford new 
bankruptcy counsel and filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
pro se in an attempt to prevent foreclosure proceedings 
on their home. Plaintiffs were thirty-three minutes 
late in filing the chapter 11. A Motion was brought to 
determinate the automatic stay, which Motion was 
granted, and Plaintiffs lost their home in which they 
had lived for twenty-four years and had an equity in 
the amount of $12,574.00. 
20. Due to the emotional distress caused by the 
foul up in their bankruptcy, the allegations of fraud 
and perjury brought against them, the delay of the new 
defenses in their Federal District Court lawsuit, and 
the loss of their home, Plaintiffs' daughter was 
obliged to move in with her sister, and subsequently 
Plaintiffs were separated for over three months. 
21. On about December 7, 1984, Plaintiffs settled 
their Federal District Court lawsuit for $15,000.00 and 
an Assignment of Rights, if any, that the Defendants in 
said lawsuit may have in the $40,000.00 deposited with 
the bankruptcy court, pursuant to a plan of 
reorganization of Great Northern Baseball Corporation. 
22. On July 16, 1985, just six days after 
Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment in their lawsuit 
against Defendant, Defendant moved to reopen 
Plaintiffs1 Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Defendant alleged 
in his Motion to reopen that he was a creditor of 
Plaintiffs and that Plaintiffs had committed 
bankruptcy fraud and income tax evasion for failure to 
report $30,000.00 in income. Defendant's Motion to 
reopen was summarily denied by the bankruptcy court. 
23. The Federal District Court lawsuit, which was 
worth $100,000.00, was diminished by 60% by reason of 
the fact that Plaintiffs' attorney, John McDonald, was 
told by Defendants' attorney that they would prepare a 
defense to detect the credibility of Dennis Job based 
upom his failure to list the lawsuit in the Chapter 7 
bankruptcy. 
C. The Conclusions of Law in the case entitled Dennis 
Job and Reta Job v. Richard Calder state that: 
1. Defendant's conduct was intentional, malicious, 
without cause or basis in fact and in reckless disregard of 
Plaintiffsf rights. 
2. Defendant's conduct represented an egregious 
violation of his legal and ethical obligations to the 
Plaintiffs. 
3. Defendant was negligent in omitting assets in the 
schedules filed with the bankruptcy court. 
4. Defendant was negligent in failing to take 
appropriate corrective action when it became known the 
omissions of assets occurred. 
5. Defendant was negligent in failing to express to 
the bankruptcy court or to the standing trustee that the 
omission was his mistake. 
6. Defendant's conduct in withdrawing as counsel was 
intentional and in reckless disregard of the rights of 
Plaintiffs. 
7. Defendant's conduct in filing a Motion to Reopen 
Plaintiffs' Chapter 11 bankruptcy was intentional, 
malicious, and in reckless disregard of the rights of 
Plaintiffs. 
8. Defendant's allegations were without any authority 
or basis in fact and it was no coincidence that Defendant 
filed said Motion just six days after Plaintiffs filed their 
Motion for partial summary judgment. 
9. Plaintiffs were damaged and defendant is liable for 
diminution in value of the lawsuit calculated as follows: 
$100,000.00 less $55,000.00 received for net of $45,000.00, 
diminution of which 60% was attributable to the conduct of 
Defendant, which sura equals $27,000.00 minus $9,000.00 that 
would have been paid from the recovery, leaving a net of 
$18,000.00. 
10. Plaintiffs were damaged and Defendant is liable for 
$240.00 in fees and costs for the Chapter 7 proceeding, 
$150.00 fees and costs for the Chapter 13 proceeding and 
$3,600.00 fees and costs for preparing the Federal District 
Court lawsuit for trial. 
11. Plaintiffs were damaged and Defendant is liable for 
$12,574.00 representing Plaintiffs' equity in their former 
home. 
12. Plaintiffs were damaged and Defendant is liable for 
$10,000.00 general damages for emotional distress and 
suffering inflicted by the reckless and/or intentional 
conduct of the Defendant. 
13. Defendant is liable for $10,000.00 general damages 
for his malicious and intentional conduct, and is liable for 
a total award of damages in the amount of $54,564.00. 
d. After the ruling of the court was rendered in Job 
v. Richard Calder, but before the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law were signed, Respondent, J. Richard 
Calder, transferred some of his assets to his brother in 
consideration of a loan. Respondent also transferred 
ownership in some of his property in Provo to his wife. 
Respondent did not obtain approval from the bankruptcy court 
to transfer those assets despite the fact that his 1984 
bankruptcy was still open. 
e. One day before the Judgment was to be signed by 
Judge Dennis Frederick, Respondent sent a notice to the 
court stating that he had a 1984 bankruptcy which precluded 
the entry of the Judgment. Judge Dennis Frederick signed 
the Judgment despite Respondent's 1984 bankruptcy. Mr. and 
Mrs. Jobfs attorney, Peter Waldo, was unaware of 
Respondent's 1984 bankruptcy until Respondent filed the 
above mentioned notice with the court. 
f. Peter Waldo then began executing on the Judgment. 
After Respondent was served but before the Sheriff's Sale 
was held, Respondent filed a 1986 bankruptcy. Peter Waldo 
filed a Motion to convert or dismiss or for relief from the 
automatic stay on behalf of the Jobs. 
g. On May 12, 1986, a hearing was held on Mr. Waldo's 
Motion. Judge John H. Allen stated in his ruling, "I find 
under all of the circumstances, each of the factors which 
have been enumerated would not be sufficient in and of 
itself, but the totality of these factors leave me to 
conclude that the Chapter 13 proceeding, which was filed on 
March 12, 1986, No. 86A-01032, was filed in bad faith. This 
bad faith is cause, under Section 1307(C) for dismissal. I 
find it would be in the best interest of creditors to 
dismiss the case and deny relief from the stay, and the 
court will order the case dismissed." 
h. Mr* Waldo filed a Motion to dismiss Respondent's 
1984 bankruptcy* On August 22, 1986, Judge John E. Allen 
dismissed Respondent's 1984 bankruptcy for lack of good 
faith. 
i. On August 19, 1986, Respondent filed a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy. The 1986 Chapter 7 bankruptcy matrix lists 
approximately 900 of respondents clients as creditors. 
During the Screening Panel meeting, Respondent indicated 
that he was not sure whether or not he still represents the 
clients that were listed on the bankruptcy matrix. 
WHEREFORE, the undersigned, on behalf of the UTAH STATE 
BAR prays that proceedings be taken herein against the 
attorney charged pursuant to the Procedures of Discipline of 
the Utah State Bar, and that restitution be provided to the 
Complainants if a final order of the appropriate court(s) 
affirms the judgment against Respondent and finds the 
judgment non-dischargable in bankruptcy, should Respondent 
challenge the judgment. The Utah State Bar also asks that 
it be awarded its costs in bringing this action. 
DATED this <?UX day of Ov^j^ 1987. 
OL ffa^^-S^ 
/iarol Nesset-Sale Jo /Jarol Nfesset-Sale Franklin L. Gunnell 
Bar Counsel Chairman, Ethics and 
Discipline Committee 
